14. The Death of Democracy
or, If Voting Could Change Anything, It Would Be Made Illegal
“…if something cannot go on forever it will stop.”
– Herbert Stein, 1986
Where once the divine right of kings was considered to be a universal principle, so now is democracy generally thought to be the only form of government that is truly legitimate (at least in the West). But what is “democracy”? What is it in reality, as it actually functions?
The presidential election of 2024 in the United States provides an instructive example regarding the nature of democracy as it currently exists. Kamala Harris, the Democrats’ candidate for President, was asked on the October 8, 2024 episode of the television program “The View” whether she would have done anything differently than President Biden (by this time known to have been mentally incompetent), and replied “there is not a thing that comes to mind in terms of – and I’ve been a part of most of the decisions that have had impact, the work that we have done” (though she did indicate later in the program that she would appoint a Republican to her cabinet, if elected. Might she have had Liz Cheney in mind, who she actually campaigned with, having sought and received the endorsement of Dick Cheney, neocon extraordinary?) In other words, Harris announced that she intended no major changes from the policies of the Biden administration, so those policies effectively became those of her campaign.
Meanwhile, Donald Trump, the Republican candidate for President, had many things to say; though given his mercurial nature (to be charitable), there was perhaps little reliable information to be gained from his utterances. On the other hand, he had actually occupied the presidency in his earlier term of office (“Trump 1”), so many may have assumed that his policies would remain much the same in a second term (“Trump 2”) – though of course this has not quite proven to be the case.
In actual fact, both Biden and Trump 2 supported Israel’s policies of ethnic cleansing in Gaza. Biden also ended up continuing Trump 1’s “maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran, which later escalated into major attacks under Trump 2. Further, Biden largely maintained Trump 1’s intensified sanctions against Cuba (until his last days in office), which Trump 2 has again escalated into a blockade. Russia and China have been the targets of punitive sanctions and trade embargoes under both Trump and Biden, with the U.S. continuing to supply Ukrainian forces with military intelligence and targeting data in the Russia-Ukraine war. In other words, concerning foreign affairs, the most important policies of Trump 1 and Biden (and by extension Harris) were largely the same, simply being escalated by Trump 2.
In the realm of domestic affairs greater differences have been exhibited between Trump and Biden/Harris, but on the whole there has been more similarity than disparity. The Biden administration relied on universities to suppress campus protests against Israel’s policies in Gaza, in which they generally succeeded, while again Trump escalated the situation (after the fact) by suing universities, fining them, and threatening federal funding. Biden not only continued the import tariffs imposed under Trump 1 but expanded them, and in the usual pattern Trump 2 greatly escalated them further in an often arbitrary fashion. In the matter of health care, there has never been any support for a program of universal medical coverage such as “Medicare for All” by either Trump or Biden (or for that matter any other leaders of the Republicans and Democrats), with Biden actually suggesting he would veto legislation establishing such if it was somehow approved by Congress. Indeed, the policy of privatizing Medicare under “Medicare Advantage” has seamlessly continued under Trump 1, Biden, and Trump 2. The Biden administration did reinvigorate anti-trust policy, under Lina Khan, to oppose monopolies, which Trump 2 has largely ended; while immigration into the U.S., both legal and unauthorized, reached a record high under Biden, being subject to increasing restriction only during his last months in office – with Trump 2 later imposing a violent crackdown that often ignored due process. But again, there has been considerable continuity in the most important issues of domestic policy, in spite of a certain amount of divergence.
What, then, were voters actually deciding in the presidential election of 2024? What could they change by voting? Given that only the Republican and Democrat candidates had any chance at all of winning the election in the “two-party” system, and given the limited differences in policy that they appeared to represent at the time, any possibility for change would also have seemed to be quite limited. Perhaps this was an important reason why the number of votes for the Democrat candidate for President declined from around 81 million in 2020 to 75 million in 2024, giving Trump a second term – in spite of the fact that the Harris campaign outspent Trump’s by a factor of more than two to one.
The U.S. mid-term elections of 2026 have served to reprimand Trump and his second administration, as well as elect a few “leftist” candidates (so designated by “moderates”) who seem as if they might favor policies that would serve the interests of the common people (rather than elites). However, what these newly elected candidates will actually be able to accomplish remains in serious question, given that they will be opposed (or co-opted) by a powerful and entrenched established order. In fact, the result of 2026 appears to have been simply a rejection of Trump by the masses, rather than anything more – as their parallel rejection of a one time tax on billionaires in California attests. Thus even the masses, taken as a whole, may not have any desire for real change.
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Though politics in the United States is usually described as operating under a two-party system, there do not seem to actually be two substantially different parties, in regard to major issues of wealth and power. In other words, as previously described in the essay “Caesar and Trump”, the Democrats and Republicans can be viewed as factions of one and the same party, perhaps best called the Elite Party, since its primary purpose is to serve elite interests. There do exist important differences between the two factions concerning “social issues”, such as abortion, gun control, diversity, religious expression, gender identity, and so on; in fact, as “polarization” has increased over past decades, these differences have only increased. However, social issues typically do not involve really large amounts of money or power. Where great issues of wealth and power are in fact concerned – issues which are of primary interest to elites – the leaders of the Democrat and Republican factions are substantially in agreement, as illustrated above. Financialization and privatization of the economy, which serve to increase elite wealth through asset appreciation, are supported by both factions – as is the exertion of hegemonic power abroad, and the expansion of mass surveillance at home, both of which are of vital importance to the elites of the ruling order. And even in the case of social issues, the money and votes of both sides of the divided electorate ultimately end up in the hands of one and the same the Elite Party.
The United States is by no means the only nation effectively governed by a single party, however, even after official one-party states, such as China, are discounted. In Europe, new political parties are more easily formed than in the U.S., which has substantial barriers to such; nevertheless, the major parties of European nations usually appear to be in substantial agreement over issues of most importance to elite wealth and power. For example, in Britain the so-called “Labour” party joined with Conservatives in supporting the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and has more recently backed Israel’s policy of ethnic cleansing in Gaza while suppressing protests against it, with both parties approving major programs to privatize government functions. Germany, on the other hand, has seen the rise of the AfD (Alternativ fur Deutschland) party, due to popular discontent with its traditional parties, though the latter have declined to make any meaningful changes to their existing policies (which are largely similar on issues of elite wealth and power), instead banding together in an attempt to form a “firewall” against coalitions with the AfD (or perhaps to ban it altogether). In other words, it is actually normal for nations to be governed by what effectively amounts to a single party, for such a party supports the most important collective interests of elites. When the consensus of the single party does break down over a serious conflict, as happened in the United States during the antebellum period, the result may be a catastrophic event, such as the American Civil War.
Of course, it may eventually begin to become clear to at least a portion of the masses, even in their usual condition of blind ignorance, that the major “parties” do not offer genuine alternatives regarding the most important issues of wealth and power. This could be why those who describe themselves as independents have increased to almost half of those eligible to vote in the United States, the remainder equally split between Republicans and Democrats. However, the problem with this situation is that independents have no leaders, no program, no organization, and so have no real political presence of their own, aggravated by the fact that they are less likely than party members to be registered to vote. Thus they are simply a disorganized mass of the disaffected, who may oscillate between voting for one party faction or another, switching when they become disillusioned, only to become disillusioned with the result once again.
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The most widely accepted notion of democratic politics is probably the “folk theory” of democracy, as described in the book Democracy for Realists by Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels. This theory holds that the people vote for who or what they want, with the desires of the majority then becoming government policy. In other words, sovereignty rests with the public. However, a serious problem with this notion of democracy lies in the assumption that the great majority of people actually know enough to be able to decide national policy. As described earlier in the essay “The Peasant Mentality”, in a 2024 survey 35 percent of Americans could not name the three branches of their national government, while 50 percent could name no more than one of the specific rights granted by the first amendment of the Constitution (and 21 percent could name none at all). In a poll conducted in 2015, 30 percent of registered Republicans supported bombing the nation of Agrabah with 13 percent being opposed, while 19 percent of Democrats supported bombing and 36 percent were opposed – in spite of the fact that Agrabah was nothing more than a fictional land that appeared in the Disney movie Aladdin. In the second chapter of Democracy for Realists Achen and Bartels report that:
“Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter (1996) surveyed responses to hundreds of specific factual questions in U.S. opinion surveys over the preceding 50 years to provide an authoritative summary of What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters. In 1952, Delli Carpini and Keeter found, only 44% of Americans could name at least one branch of government. In 1972, only 22% knew something about Watergate [though this increased to 54% by 1973]. In 1985, only 59% knew whether their own state’s governor was a Democrat or a Republican. In 1986, only 49% knew which one nation in the world had used nuclear weapons (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 70, 81, 74, 84).”
Even worse than a deficiency of information, however, is the acquisition of misinformation. In the second chapter of What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters, Carpini and Keeter relate that:
“For example, large percentages of Americans believe that the Constitution guarantees a job (29 percent), health care (42 percent), and a high school education (75 percent) … Forty-five percent of those polled thought the communist tenet ‘from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs,’ was found in the Constitution. [!]
Not all the examples of projection involved an expansion of rights and liberties. To the contrary, many believe that a person can be tried twice for the same crime (29 percent), that a member of the Communist party cannot run for president (45 percent), that revolutionary speech is not protected by the Constitution (51 percent), and that an accused person must prove his innocence (50 percent). There is also a willingness to extend powers to the president, even if they are contrary to the basic principles of checks and balances. Besides the example of war powers discussed below, many Americans believe the president has the power to adjourn Congress at his will (35 percent), to suspend the Constitution (49 percent), and to appoint judges to the federal courts without the approval of the Senate (60 percent).”
Political partisanship is an important contributor to misinformation, of course, as described in Chapter One of Democracy for Realists:
“Even on purely factual questions with clear right answers, citizens are sometimes willing to believe the opposite if it makes them feel better about their partisanship and vote choices. We illustrate this phenomenon by examining beliefs about a highly salient and significant political fact – the size of the federal budget deficit. The deficit had decreased by more than half during Bill Clinton’s first term as president; yet most Republicans in a 1996 survey managed to convince themselves that it had increased. Even many Democrats and Independents had too little real information to get the facts right, but for Republicans the lack of information was compounded by a partisan desire to see a Democratic administration in a negative light. Indeed, moderately well-informed Republicans had less accurate beliefs than the least informed; a modicum of information was sufficient to discern what they should want to be true, but not enough to discern what was in fact true. They sounded like they were thinking, but no one should be fooled. Democrats behaved in much the same way on other issues.”
And then there is always the effect of sheer propaganda, as famously demonstrated by the campaign to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by claiming the possession of “weapons of mass destruction” by the regime of Saddam Hussein, a campaign that was rewarded with the re-election of George Bush in 2004.
However, aside from possession of information itself, the ability to apply it in a logical way when voting is another challenge – for it would appear that many people lack any coherent position on public policy. In the 1964 paper “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” by Philip Converse, a poll of those who voted in 1956 revealed that 3.5 percent of them could be classified as “ideologues” (that is, who possessed an organized system of political principles by which issues were judged), 12 percent as “near-ideologues”, 45 percent as “group interest” voters (that is, their opinions were governed by their particular social group, but demonstrated little in the way of political principles beyond this), 22 percent were “nature of the times” voters (that is, were simply influenced by what they felt was the general state of affairs had been, or a particular issue that was of importance to them), and 17.5 percent demonstrated “no issue content” whatever. (An example of a “group interest” voter was presented in the paper, an individual who described himself as a “socialist” because he was a worker, and socialists stood for workers against the rich; however, he also felt that the government should “should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle”, in stark contradiction of socialist policy.) Thus the overwhelming majority of voters displayed no coherent basis on which to judge the issues of the day.
In fact, how the masses view the nature of “democracy” itself may be open to question. In a survey conducted in 2024 by the Alliance of Democracies, 79 percent of Chinese citizens indicated that their government was democratic – a higher portion than in the U.S., Britain, or France – in spite of the fact that China has no direct elections for its national leadership. However, China has also seen astonishing economic growth in past decades, raising the standard of living for the common people. Thus, if democracy is supposed to be “government of the people, by the people, and for the people”, then for most voters the emphasis may be on government for the people, regardless of how such government is actually constituted.
Finally, though their lack of available knowledge is a serious failing of many voters, another, perhaps even greater problem arises from the fact that crucial knowledge may not be available. For example, in a debate during the year 2000 presidential election campaign, candidate George Bush claimed that he would have a “humble” foreign policy, stating “If we are an arrogant nation, they will resent us; but if we’re a humble nation, but strong, they’ll welcome us.” Yet in a National Security Council meeting soon after Bush’s inauguration in January 2001, Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill was astonished to learn that Bush had already begun planning a possible invasion of Iraq – months before the attack on the World Trade Center in September. In another case, during his 2024 campaign Donald Trump sought to disavow Project 2025, a plan submitted by the Heritage Foundation to enhance and consolidate executive power for the purpose of executing ultra-conservative policies; Trump called attempts to tie him to the plan “ridiculous”, “pure disinformation”, and described Project 2025 as “abysmal”, causing the director of the project, Paul Dans, to resign. However, after the election, several of the most prominent authors of the plan have become important officials in the Trump administration, and a majority of the plan’s proposals have been implemented by Trump’s policies. How, then, could even informed voters have known that Bush planned from the very beginning to invade Iraq? Or that Trump would actually put Project 2025 into effect?
In fact, aside from their actual policies, even the true natures of “well known” political figures may be completely obscure. 1997 saw the publication of The Dark Side of Camelot by Seymour Hersh, which revealed that the moral and heroic portrait of John F. Kennedy presented to the public had, in many ways, been a sham. To be sure, Kennedy did possess extraordinary personal charisma, exhibited a rare quality of leadership in addressing the people, and was generally competent in discharging his duties as chief executive. However, if even half of Hersh’s book is true (and much, much more would appear to be true, given testimony from many of the principals involved, including several Secret Service agents, and Hersh’s general policy of obtaining corroboration), then Kennedy was beyond even a “playboy” in his uncountable sexual escapades, which left him vulnerable to possible blackmail (and caused him to be constantly re-infected with venereal disease); had continual dealings with organized crime, intended to ensure his election in 1960, and effect the assassination of Fidel Castro; approved government policies to engage in other assassinations and secret policies of regime change; all the while willing to do anything to conceal the truth of his actions, including the extent of his involvement in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. In truth, many politicians (if not most) live a very different reality from their public image, with Kennedy’s opponent in 1960, Richard Nixon, being quite crooked in his own right (as Hersh mentions in his book) – Kennedy was simply a spectacular example of a general pattern of camouflage and deception. Thus voters usually have very little (if any) accurate knowledge of the presidential candidates in an election – and even less of all the many other candidates for lesser positions on the ballot. Who are the contenders for office – really? And once in office, what will they actually do?
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Given the serious collisions with reality that beset the folk theory of democracy, an alternative has been put forward in the form of the “retrospective” theory of voting, which contends that voters reward or punish candidates based on knowledge of their past performance in office (or the performance of their party), rather than knowledge of policy positions or even the basic functions of government. Thus, if things seem to be going well, votes will tend to go to incumbents; if things seem to be going badly, votes will go to challengers. Obviously there is certain amount of truth in this idea, since the current state of affairs will clearly have some effect on voting.
However, serious problems can arise from an undue emphasis on what is current. Developments of long duration can have a substantial effect on present conditions, which may undermine the validity of retrospective theory. In this regard, the state of the economy is of prime importance for retrospective voting; as Achen and Bartels put it at the beginning of the sixth chapter of Democracy for Realists: “The contribution of modern political science has been to provide an impressive body of systematic evidence that voters reward incumbent politicians for good economic times and punish them for bad times (Kramer 1971; Lewis-Beck 1988; Markus 1988; and many others).” However, Achen and Bartels then go on to demonstrate that while growth in personal income during the six months prior to an election will usually have a powerful effect on its outcome, income growth before this will have dramatically less. In other words, the average voter tends to have a very short term memory; compounding this is the fact that economic results in the present may be determined by policies established years or even decades before, or by factors that are largely outside the influence of political policy altogether, such as demographic structural trends (discussed in previous essays), alterations in social cohesion, fundamental developments in agriculture or industry, or even the weather (if it produces a bad harvest, for example).
But then, it is clear that voters also exhibit a short term memory in many other respects, for instance forgetting Bush the Younger’s promise of a “humble” foreign policy (to the extent they even knew of it), instead rewarding him in the election of 2004 for his invasion of Iraq, compounded (again) by the blindly ignorant belief of almost 70 percent of them (as revealed in a Washington Post survey of August 2003) that Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Indeed, the issue of knowledge arises to bedevil the retrospective theory, just as it did the folk theory. That is, do people accurately assess the existing conditions that may influence their voting – do they actually know what those conditions are? For example, the degree to which pollution affects the environment may not be obvious, unless an individual happens to be directly affected by an aspect of it. The perennial issue of the crime rate is another area where misperception can arise, as described in Chapter Four of Democracy for Realists:
“Public perceptions of the prevalence of crime seem to be more strongly related to local media coverage of crime – largely a product of broadcasters’ commercial incentives – than to official crime rates (Graber 1980). Thus, Gallup polls typically find majorities of respondents saying that crime is increasing, and pluralities saying that crime in their area is increasing, even though recent actual “rates of violent crime as well as property crime have generally leveled off at extremely low numbers” (Saad 2007).”
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Since neither the folk nor retrospective theory seem to provide a satisfactory description of democracy as it actually exists, it would appear that an alternative is needed. Beginning in the eighth chapter of Democracy for Realists, such an alternative is in fact presented – one whose basis, at least, has been recognized for a long time. On this matter Achen and Bartels quote James Madison in Federalist Number 10:
“A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose for tunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for the common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into animosities that where no substantial occasion presents itself the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts.”
In other words, politics – including democratic politics – is largely a matter of partisanship based on group membership. As Achen and Bartels go on to comment, in regard to Madison’s statement:
“As we will show, that passage prefigures most of the key psychological ideas of the group theory of politics – the powerful tendency of people to form groups, the ensuing construction of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ and the powerful role of emotion rather than reason in directing group activity. Madison also anticipated the experimental finding of 20th-century psychologists that group attachments are easily generated and profoundly felt. People are naturally group oriented.”
Democracy for Realists outlines the contributions made by a number of sociologists and other scholars concerning group membership theories of society, and summarizes their conclusions:
“Human beings are cultural animals, and they spend their years absorbing in great detail the various subcultures in which they participate. From this viewpoint, all the great issues of life – religion, nationality, gender roles, popular scientific ideas, partisan loyalties, the value of different occupations, the appeal of different foods – are taught to the vast majority of people by their family, their culture, and their subcultures. At a slower pace, socialization to group norms continues through out adulthood. Indeed, it is a commonplace that what passes for ‘going your own way’ or ‘thinking for yourself’ turns out to be, in practice, just switching from one set of culturally conditioned ideas to another, equally preformulated set.”
Also mentioned is the experimental work of Henri Tajfel on group theory (earlier referred to in the fourth essay in this series, “Us and Them”.)
Concerning political issues, a book by Chicago journalist Arthur Bentley is described as being prescient in its conclusions about the influence of groups:
“In The Process of Government, Bentley (1908) emphasized the importance of groups in politics – all sorts of groups, including organized interest groups, self-conscious but politically unorganized social groups, potential groups not yet self-conscious, and governmental actors. He saw most governmental decisions as decisively influenced by the power and intensity of rival groups. He also described the ability of intense minorities to get their way when the majority is apathetic, uninterested, or unorganized. The strategic choice of techniques by pressure groups, the legal and normative rules structuring group conflict, the role of parties as group coalitions, and the impact of government as both referee and independent actor – all these are discussed. Indeed, there is not much of theoretical import in subsequent group theories of the policymaking process that is not anticipated in Bentley’s book.”
Refining the argument, Democracy for Realists then introduces the idea that simple membership in a group is not the ultimate factor in forming political attitudes – what is most important is the degree to which such membership influences identity; that is, the degree to which group identity becomes an individual member’s identity. For example, the group phenomenon of religion can form an important element of personal identity, as demonstrated by the U.S. presidential election of 1960, in which John F. Kennedy was the candidate of the Democrats, and the first Catholic since Al Smith in 1928. Despite the fact that Kennedy very forcefully stated his support for separation of church and state, the issue of religious affiliation was to prove of great importance. In a chapter of the book Elections and the Political Order, Philip Converse presented a detailed analysis which estimated that in 1960, churchgoing Catholics were 15 percent more likely to vote for a Democrat (Kennedy) that had usually been the case in the past, and even those who seldom or never attended church were 10 percent more likely. On the other hand, churchgoing white Protestants were 21 percent less likely to vote for the Democrat than they normally would, and non-churchgoers 7 percent less likely. Of course, since 1960 a realignment has occurred in which Catholics are often in alliance with conservative Protestants, but race is an element of identity which may be even more fundamental than religion, and retains its influence today; thus in elections for the House of Representatives in 2014, black candidates were elected in 98 percent of the districts with majorities of black voters.
Political partisanship itself can become part of identity, to the extent of altering perception of the world. As previously mentioned, in a 1996 survey a majority of Republicans said that the federal budget deficit had increased during the first term of the Clinton administration, whereas in reality it had decreased by more than half. And as Democracy for Realists makes clear, the beliefs of Democrats are also subject to being skewed by partisanship; for example, a 1988 survey by American National Election Studies asked how the rate of inflation had changed since 1980 (under the Reagan administration), to which more than half of “strong” Democrats answered that it had gotten worse, in spite of the fact that it had fallen by more than two thirds.
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Even if group identity provides an improved description of the way democracy works, in comparison with the folk or retrospective theories, the original question still remains: namely, what purpose does democracy serve? What is its true function?
Every state of substantial size has a governing class of elites that determines its policies and directs its course in the world. This is true without exception, both today and throughout the course of history. To be sure, public opinion may exert certain constraints, to varying degrees; but the formulation of policy is always the product of elite decisions. Thus every system of national government, from totalitarian dictatorship to representative democracy, has its governing elites, the leaders of the nation.
The crucial (indeed defining) difference which separates democracy from other, more authoritarian systems of government is the manner in which its ruling elites are determined: by voting. Those eligible to vote always constitute a large segment of the population (but might be subject to limitation by sex, race, age, property qualification, citizenship, or condition of servitude). A broadened freedom of expression and other formal political rights, along with access to due process, usually accompanies the establishment of democracy, which is appropriate and necessary for participation (by ballot) in determining the makeup of the government – however, voting itself is the basic element which defines democracy.
In the West, democratic government has become universal. Of course, this was not always so; in past centuries the norm was absolute monarchy, or monarchy with constitutional limitations imposed by custom or the nobility. However, from its very beginning (which, according to Oswald Spengler, was seen in the tenth century), the West has exhibited a marked bias for liberalism – if defined as an ideology whose essence is innovation, as opposed to conservatism’s essence of preservation (as discussed in the earlier essay “The Dreams of Ideology”). Liberalism’s spirit of innovation was initially evident in the technical sphere, producing world-changing developments such as gunpowder weapons and movable type printing, a medieval revolution of water and wind power, the navigational advances and achievements of the Age of Exploration, a Second Agricultural Revolution (of the seventeenth century), and finally the great Industrial Revolution. A fundamental reorganization of society accompanied these developments, as sources of wealth shifted from landed estates to expanding domains of commerce and industry. New elites were created by the commercial sphere, the bourgeoisie, whose makeup and interests were quite different from those of the old landed nobility.
In line with their rapidly growing wealth, the new bourgeois elites also began to seek political power. But how were governing elites to be selected from among them? And how was their rule to be legitimized, so crucial to its effectiveness? Monarchs and nobles had gained their positions through inheritance (and sometimes by fire and sword), legitimized by what was believed to be the will of God; they ostensibly ruled by divine right. The new elites might seek to gain power by revolution or political evolution, but this power was to be legitimized by a new creed of democracy – the divine right of the people – Vox Populi Vox Dei. Selection of ruling elites by voting avoided open warfare among them, which would have been very destructive to commercial interests; further, it gave the newly literate masses the impression that they had a decisive voice in government (literacy being essential for a competent industrial workforce). Thus the function of democracy was to provide an orderly process for the selection of ruling elites while also legitimizing them, a function that was true to the West’s spirit of innovation by supplanting the old method of selection through inheritance.
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Though democracy has been universal in the West for many decades, of late it has shown signs of decline, particularly in the United States. The result of the U.S. presidential election of 2016 was challenged on the grounds that it was supposedly decided by “Russian interference” and that the victor Donald Trump was himself a “Russian agent”, which led to Trump’s impeachment in 2019, which failed to convict him. However, no substantial evidence has been ever produced that confirms the allegations made. Then, after the election of 2020, Trump claimed that Joe Biden’s victory was “stolen” by widespread fraud, and an attempt was made to produce “alternate electors” to overturn the result, followed by a riot at the Capitol building on January 6, 2021, and a second impeachment of Trump, which once more failed to convict; but again, no substantial evidence of widespread fraud in the election has been produced. Such momentous and highly public irregularities in the American electoral process are unprecedented in modern times, matched only by those of the election of 1876, in the aftermath of the Civil War and Reconstruction.
Even more serious, though, are the deficiencies in leadership that are the product of recent presidential elections. Trump himself had never held public office or a military command prior to his election in 2016, which was unparalleled for an American president, and may well have affected his subsequent performance; but the principal novelty of his administration, in comparison with earlier ones, was the public openness of its tendency to corrupt malevolence. During the term of his successor, however, it was eventually revealed that President Biden had actually become mentally incompetent – a potentially devastating development, especially considering the kind of leadership that had been personally demanded of John Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In any case, the point at which Biden’s mental incompetence became clear to those around him, and the degree to which it affected his performance, remain cloaked in deliberate obscurity.
Now, during Trump’s second term, enormously lower depths have been plumbed: a “Department of Government Efficiency” that failed to deliver any meaningful result other than chaos; drastic and arbitrary increases in tariffs, some of which have already been ruled illegal by the highest court in the land; a weaponization of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, which sometimes performs without due process and occasionally with criminal violence; the dispatch of the National Guard into various cities at personal whim; attacks on universities under the guise of supposed “anti-semitism”; witch-hunt policies to combat vague “terrorist” threats of “anti-capitalism”, “communism”, and “antifa”; naked aggression in Latin America, involving a blockade of Cuba, the extermination of crews of small boats which are alleged (without supporting evidence) to have been carrying illicit drugs, and an operation to kidnap of the leader of Venezuela; and then, after a wanton attack on Iran in June 2025 failed to dislodge its regime (instead revealing it to be much more resilient than many had supposed), a second attack was launched (incredibly enough) at the end of February 2026, which achieved no more success than the first, but rather elevated Iran to the rank of a world power, and threatens to disrupt the world’s economy, plunging it into crisis. Finally, topping all this off in petty sordidness are Trump’s schemes to use his office for personal enrichment, especially through “cryptocurrencies”.
In other words, the last three executive administrations of United States – all produced by modern democracy – have exhibited a pattern of increasing incompetence, finally culminating in open malfeasance and disastrous ineptitude.
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What has caused the present decline of democratic government? One could point at the common people, since it is by their votes that leaders are elected to office. Indeed, the single-minded support of MAGA (“Make America Great Again”) voters has been essential to the rise of Donald Trump. Yet though the MAGA supporters constitute a substantial voting bloc, they alone did not elevate Trump to the pinnacle of power. A fascinating phenomenon is presented by those who voted for Obama in 2012 but switched to Trump in 2016 – they likely provided more than 10 percent of Trump’s votes, and seem to have desired some sort of “change” (which would not have been seen with his opponent, Hillary Clinton, the very embodiment of the established order). It could even be said that Biden might have represented a change from Trump in 2020, and Trump a change from Biden/Harris in 2024. Such desire for change by at least some of the masses may have been stimulated by stress, due to rising inequality and declining prospects for the future, with children learning that they will be materially less well-off than their parents; resulting in votes being cast for one side, then the other (but never achieving what is sought). Stress may also have been a factor in the rise of the MAGA voters themselves, causing the blind ignorance of a portion of the masses to deteriorate into the blind hostility of know-nothings (as described in the earlier essay “The Peasant Mentality”).
In any case, the common people cannot be blamed for a failure of national democracy, because they have always lacked the capacity to make it a success. The blind ignorance of the masses, as documented above, renders their success impossible. Democracy is actually a system of elite government (as it always is, for any government), with elites controlling the “parties”, the ballot, and the major media. Where democracy has worked – or seemed to have worked – is an achievement of elites: elite embrace of democracy as a method for selecting the leaders of the nation, with the acceptance of voting results for peaceful transfers of power; and results that produce elite leaders with at least minimal competence to govern in the national interest. The American presidential elections of 2016 and 2020 revealed a distinct resistance to accepting the result on the part of the losers, while the last three elections failed to produce leaders of minimal competence (in at least one case, not even of mental competence). Thus the failure of democracy has been a failure of elites.
Why have elites failed? In the first place, the democratic system itself rewards those who are best able to gain votes that will obtain an office – that is the criterion for success, rather than the ability to perform the duties of the office. Superficial persuasiveness, deception, chicanery, payoffs, service to great wealth, partisan solicitations, and appeals to the lowest common denominator can – and in fact, do – gain votes. When coupled with cleverness and popular appeal, sheer ambition and ruthlessness are usually rewarded (though they must be measured in application, and possibly concealed). Of course, an ability to gain votes may also be related, to some extent, to an ability to perform in office – to organize effort and enlist support. Survival of the rigors of an electoral campaign may also indicate the capacity to endure the demands of wielding power. But in any case, the divergence between vote getting and performance in office has existed since the inception of democracy, and does not explain the recent acceleration of elite failure.
What has changed are the attitudes of elites, and the environment in which they operate. In the United States, an attitude of “crisis consensus” was forged among elites during the Great Depression and Second World War – many were affected by these events directly, and in any case it was generally recognized that challenges had arisen that could only be overcome by a devotion to national purpose. But afterward, though sustained to some extent by the Cold War, the crisis consensus began to erode, being undermined by the debacle of Vietnam, and increasingly replaced by a devotion to self-interest that was equated to national interest (via an “invisible hand”), as epitomized by Gordon Gekko and Margaret Thatcher: “greed is good” and “there is no such thing as society”. This trend was only accelerated by the demise of the Soviet Union as chief adversary, as well as the supposed “end of history”, which seemed to grant permission for elites to seek their own interest by any and all means, diminishing any commitment to a democratic system and competent leadership. Such an idea of the formation and erosion of a crisis consensus is similar to the observations of the medieval Arab scholar Ibn Khaldun concerning growth and decline of social solidarity (“asabiya”), and a modern expansion of the concept in the form of the Metaethnic Frontier Theory of Peter Turchin; put simply, nothing brings people together like a fundamental challenge to existence or a common enemy.
However, though a change of attitude – the erosion of a crisis consensus – has been an important factor in the failure of elites to adequately support democracy, it still does not completely explain it. The serious breakdown of leadership and commitment to democracy across three successive presidential administrations is unique in American history, which has seen crises before. A second and essential cause of failure may be found in the competitive environment of elites, as described in the Demographic Structural Theory of Jack Goldstone, again expanded and further developed by Peter Turchin (dealt with in greater detail in the essay “A New History”). This theory proposes that the increase in inequality seen in recent decades has brought about a substantial increase in the number of elites in American society; which, in turn, has led to increased competition among them for limited resources – particularly in the realm of politics, where the number of government positions available is relatively limited (there can be only one president, for example). Further, those who fail to achieve higher status may become disaffected “counter-elites”, who are opposed to the current system and might even wish to bring it down with some kind of revolution. In this environment of increasingly savage competition and disaffected “losers”, established standards begin to break down, with elites willing to go further and further with drastic measures to achieve “success” – resulting in democracy and dedication to the nation (or anything else not serving personal ambition) becoming victims of collateral damage.
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The ominous signs of a decline of democracy in the United States have been accompanied by symptoms of something similar in Europe, with leaders of its most important nations testing new depths of unpopularity, and the technocratic hierarchy of the European Union having only a passing resemblance to any kind of democratic government. Thus it would appear that the deterioration has been widespread in the West.
Given such a general decline of democracy, what might be its prospects for the future? Unfortunately, the indications are not favorable. Yes, the result of the 2026 national election in the United States was a stunning condemnation of a failed policies, a demonstation of what the institution of democracy is capable of. However, it is probable that it will also prove to be a demonstation of what democracy is not capable of. A democratic “litmus test” for domestic policy would be a fundamental reform of the bloated American medical system, a reform that provides universal coverage and reduces inflated costs, something that the great majority of the population urgently desires – but is there any reasonable chance that such a reform will be effected? A similar test for foreign policy would involve a reduction of the effort to establish hegemonic control of the world, and instead concentrate on genuine security for the United States, but is there any real possibility that total subjugation of the western hemisphere, domination of Eurasia, and limitless support for Israel will be abandoned? In all likelihood the democratic system will fail these tests, for the limited number of newly elected candidates who seem to advocate the necessary changes will be unable to make much headway against entrenched institutional interests governed by money and power, and there will be relentless pressure (and opportunity) for the candidates to be co-opted by the established order itself. Such a result would simply mean a return to a failimg status quo (which has been seen after other elections signaled desire for change), and a continued deterioration of democracy. For as previously observed, though the masses may sometimes object to national policy, they do not make policy – elites do, and they have a thousand ways of getting what they want.
In fact, despite the increasingly unpopularity of the leaders of the West, there would appear to be no replacements on the horizon who genuinely desire change and have the capability – the talent and shrewdness – to bring it about. Instead, elite ambitions for money and power have been institutionalized and actually justified under the slogans “greed is good” and “there is no such thing as society”. So it is that one failed leader succeeds another, for it truly seems that “there is no alternative”. The masses plod on in blind ignorance, led by elites devoted to blind ambition, while know-nothings bound to blind hostility increase in number. The most deadly problem, however, is one of incompetence – that elite leaders, elevated to their positions by the mechanism of democracy, fail to govern their nations in even a minimally adequate way.
If democracy does not produce competent leadership, then another system of government may arise that will supply what is necessary. Such, at any rate, would conform to the pattern of history proposed by Oswald Spengler, when he described the advent of “Caesarism”. As he put it in The Decline of the West, Volume II, Chapter XI, The State: State and History:
“By the term ‘Caesarism’ I mean that kind of government which, irrespective of any constitutional formulation that it may have, is in its inward self a return to thorough formlessness. It does not matter that Augustus in Rome, and Huang Ti in China, Amasis in Egypt, and Alp Arslan in Baghdad disguised their position under antique forms. The spirit of these forms was dead, and so all institutions, however carefully maintained, were thenceforth destitute of all meaning and weight. Real importance centered in the wholly personal power exercised by the Caesar, or by anybody else capable of exercising it in his place.”
In other words, Caesarism is autocratic rule – but more than this, the nature of such rule is obscured by the maintenance of traditional forms and institutions, which no longer have any actual function or meaning, just as Caesar Augustus ruled while maintaining the hollowed out forms of the Roman Republic. For Spengler, the rise of Caesarism was inevitable in a high culture, following the rise of a hegemonic power within the culture; and for the West, that hegemon has proven to be the United States.
Thus an American Caesar would rule in a situation in which the Congress and highest courts continue to exist in name only, with no real purpose, necessarily following the will of the president in every matter of importance. The outline of such a situation is already apparent, with the legislative branch of government having delegated most of its warmaking, diplomatic, and even trade policy powers to the executive. The last time Congress declared war was December, 1941, in spite of numerous military operations undertaken by the United States since then; and going even further, the president theoretically has the power to order unlimited nuclear warfare, with John Kennedy actually having the practical capacity to do so during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. More recently, Donald Trump has imposed huge increases in trade tariffs, always finding some authority to implement them in one piece of congressional legislation or another, and has initiated a major war against Iran with practically no reference to Congress at all. Of course, the Republican Party that has (up to now) controlled Congress has effectively become the Trump Party, due to the votes of MAGA supporters, who themselves would only be too pleased by the enthronement of Trump as “President-for-Life”; while the Democrats have so far done very little to rein Trump in, satisfied with being the not-Trump Party, and perhaps looking forward to eventually gaining similar authoritarian powers for their own faction.
Nevertheless, Trump himself will not be the American Caesar (as pointed out in the previous essay “Caesar and Trump”), for he lacks necessary the ability and shrewdness, as were evident in Octavian’s seizure of power under the ambiguous title of Princeps. Instead, he helps to establish a precedent, demonstrating just how much a president can already do with the existing powers at hand. The true advent of Caesarism in the West may come in the wake of a great crisis, the possibilities for which seem to be constantly multiplying: a cataclysmic weather event, earthquake, or some other natural disaster of unprecedented magnitude; the complete collapse of a grossly inflated economy; an epidemic more deadly and persistent than that recently seen; a very severe military defeat, a terrorist attack exceeding the destruction of the World Trade Center, or even a nuclear exchange. Another possibility is that the ruling order may simply accept or anoint a rising autocrat in order to “set things right” in a steadily deteriorating situation, as happened in Germany in 1933.
In any case, a leader will emerge, likely one of apparent competence and wide appeal, who “of necessity” will govern by decree for the duration of the emergency. An emergency that of course will continue on and on – unlike the preceding democracy, which failed to produce adequate leadership for a world which demanded it … and so had to die.
For as it was put bluntly in 1986: “if something cannot go on forever, it will stop.”
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Sources
Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government, by Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, published 2016. An examination of the actual, functioning nature of democracy in the United States, as opposed to popular conceptions.
Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, by Jack A. Goldstone, published 1991. The foundational work of demographic structural theory in its quantitative analysis of history.
Ages of Discord: A Structural-Demographic Analysis of American History, by Peter Turchin, published 2016. Examines history with mathematical modeling, correlated with empirical observation; and applies to the United States, in particular, a demographic structural analysis updated for a modern industrial society.
End Times: Elites, Counter-Elites, and the Path of Political Disintegration, by Peter Turchin, published 2023. A work largely directed at a general audience that warns of the increasing danger of social and political disaffection.
The Decline of the West: Sketch of a Morphology of World History, by Oswald Spengler; Volume One: Form and Actuality originally published 1918, revised edition 1923; Volume Two: Perspectives of World-History published 1922; English translation and notes by Charles Francis Atkinson, Volume One published 1926, Volume Two 1928.
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A Personal Afterword
My own disaffection with the “folk theory” of democracy began more than 50 years ago, brought into sharp focus by my experience of the U.S. election of 1976. In the wake of the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s resignation things were of course seen in a different light; but I became aware of issues even more fundamental. Looking at the election ballot, I wondered: who are these people? And what will they actually do if elected? In the case of even the most prominent candidates I realized that I knew next to nothing, for it was apparent that they often projected a contrived image of themselves, while the media which reported on them was generally content to deal in superficialities (or worse, accepted dogmas). And regarding the candidates for lower offices (of which there were so many) I knew even less…
As a result I did not vote at all for almost four decades after 1976. Beginning with the primary election of 2016 I did begin to vote again, but only for candidates and ballot propositions which I felt I might know enough about (thanks partly to alternative sources of information) to make them worth voting for (which were quite few in number). I have had no qualms about leaving all the ballot spaces for a given office blank, even (or perhaps especially) for the position of President of the United States.
I would also point out (once again) that my view of the inevitability of the rise of Caesarism is in no way an approval of it. It is an observation, not an endorsement. As I noted in the essay “The Face of Power”, if a man falls from the top of a hundred story building, the observation that he is likely to die does not in any way connote a desire that he should die. It is simply a statement of what will happen, not what should happen.
The first Caesar who appears in the West will undoubtedly be more competent than the leaders who immediately preceded him – but that will be a necessary qualification to gain the position of Caesar itself, and may also be a rather low bar. The trouble arises with what follows after the new Caesar, just as Augustus was eventually followed by Caligula, Marcus Aurelius was followed by Commodus, and so on and so on. Autocracy will appear, due to the demand of history, when democracy finally fails, but autocracy itself will eventually fail. That is the great tragedy of civilization, and the part it plays in the tragedy of life itself.