4. Us and Them

or, Blue versus Green, for the Win!


“From my grandfather Verus I learned good morals and the government of my temper … from my first teacher, to be neither of the Green nor of the Blue party at the games in the Circus, nor a partisan either of the Parmularius or the Scutarius at the gladiators’ fights…”

– Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Meditations, Book I


“I am the more astonished that so many thousands of grown men should be possessed again and again with a childish passion to look at galloping horses, and men standing upright in their chariots … but in fact it is a bit of cloth they favor, a bit of cloth that captivates them. And if during the running the racers were to exchange colors, their partisans would change sides, and instantly forsake the very drivers and horses whom they were just before recognizing from afar, and clamorously saluting by name.”

– Pliny the Younger, Letters, 9.6


“In every city the population has been divided for a long time past into the Blue and the Green factions … and they fight against their opponents knowing not for what end they imperil themselves, but knowing well that, even if they overcome their enemy in the fight, the conclusion of the matter for them will be to be carried off straightway to the prison…”

– Procopius, History of the Wars, I.24.1


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Chariot racing was a spectacular, dangerous, and extraordinarily popular sport in Roman society during both the Republic and Empire (depicted in our later age in Ben-Hur).  It took place in venues called “circuses” (from the Latin for “circle”), the largest and most important of these being the Circus Maximus in the capital itself.  Those taking part were organized into teams, much like the auto racing teams of the present day, and there were traditionally four of them, identified by their colors: Blue, Green, Red, and White.

As is usual with sporting events, chariot racing had its devoted fans – followers of one or another of the traditional teams.  However, these fans appear to have been unusually fanatical.  In 77 BC, a distraught adherent of the Reds threw himself on the funeral pyre of a famous charioteer for his team (as reported by Pliny the Elder).  Followers of different teams – “factions” identified by their respective colors – often clashed, sometimes in vicious riots.

Chariot racing maintained its popularity in Byzantium after the fall of the Western Empire, all the more so as the gladiatorial games came to an end.  The Blue and Green teams eventually eclipsed the others (a trend already evident during the youth of Marcus Aurelius, as noted in the quote above), and conflict between their two factions, now in purely dualistic opposition, became even more heated.  Pitched battles between them sometimes resulted in hundreds of deaths.  Since racing events were among the very few kinds of public gatherings in which the people could air their grievances, the result was a situation with an explosive potential for trouble.

In fact, trouble between the Blues and Greens finally came to have catastrophic consequences, threatening the fate of the Byzantine Empire itself.  In the year 532 a botched execution of ringleaders involved in fighting between the two factions led to the infamous Nika riot, in which much of the city of Byzantium was burned down.  The situation had been aggravated by political tensions – shortly before, no fewer than 26 new taxes had been imposed by the emperor Justinian, many of them falling on the wealthiest citizens, who apparently exploited the unrest in an attempt to depose their ruler.  They nearly succeeded.  But with the encouragement of the empress Theodora, Justinian stood firm, and the devastating rampage of the factions was eventually suppressed when loyal troops were sent in, slaughtering thousands of the rioters in a gruesome bloodbath.


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There are many varieties of social creatures, with their own particular social organizations – wolves and their packs, ants and their nests, baboons and their troops.  In each case, survival for the individual is made possible by membership in a group.  Human beings are also instinctively social by nature, in fact intensely so; one of the harshest punishments that can be dealt out is solitary confinement.  

The family is the most basic of all human social groups, ranging from nuclear to extended.  But larger groups have also arisen during the course of history: clans, tribes, chiefdoms, city-states, nations, empires.  And within them their populations have spawned clubs, political parties, guilds, congregations, leagues, societies, and sports factions; groups of every imaginable purpose and type.  So it has been to the present day.

Every social group thus formed creates an ‘us’: those within the group.  But by very definition, it also creates a ‘them’ – those outside, the foreigners, the different ones, the others.

Hence behavior that distinguishes between us and them becomes pervasive.  In the example of ancient chariot racing, the Blues and the Greens were at first differentiated by nothing more than the colors they wore, as commented upon by Pliny the Younger; and later, other factors would, at times, come into play in their opposition – political, economic, perhaps even religious – finally producing spasms of lethal violence.  But the initial divergence, which preceded all the others, was no more than the difference between blue and green, a simple difference that eventually provoked violence that fed upon itself, each new reprisal leading to yet another.

The “minimal group paradigm”, in the terminology of social psychology, refers to the minimum conditions that will cause such differentiation between groups.  Aside from historical episodes in the vein of Blues versus Greens, evidence for the paradigm has also been gained from clinical investigation.  In a classic experiment conducted by researcher Henri Tajfel and reported in 1970, boys from an English school (14-15 years of age) were separated into two groups, supposedly based on their ability to estimate the number of dots projected on a screen, or their preference for the highly abstract works of either of two “foreign modern painters” (Klee and Kandinsky).  In actuality, however, this process of assignment to the groups had been merely a cover, as it was essentially random in nature.  Each subject was then directed to assign awards (involving small sums of money) to various other participants in the experiment (whose identities were kept anonymous); half of those to be awarded were in the subject’s own group, and half in the other.  It turned out that subjects tended to favor their own group with awards that were much larger than those for the other group, even though the separation into groups had been effectively done at random, and all those involved knew each other quite well.  The mere separation into groups was enough to trigger differentiation of treatment.

In a more informal setting, that of a third grade class in Riceville, Iowa, teacher Jane Elliott decided to conduct an exercise in social tolerance after the assassination of Martin Luther King in 1968.  On the first day of the exercise, the students were informed that brown-eyed people had been determined to be superior to blue-eyed ones.  Immediately – and to an astonishing degree – the students began to behave as if those with brown eyes really were superior, as a group, to their blue-eyed classmates.  All that was required was a difference in eye color, and the influence of their teacher.  The next day the roles were reversed, when it was declared that a mistake had been made, and that blue-eyed people were instead superior.  This exercise was repeated with different classes for some years thereafter, and was the subject of the documentary The Eye of the Storm in 1970, as well as an episode of the PBS Frontline series in 1985, and the book A Class Divided: Then and Now.

Thus it is clear that almost any difference, real or supposed, may induce people to form a group of us and thereby distinguish their selves from them.  The difference may originate in race, ethnicity, nationality, sex, social class, religion, occupation, neighborhood, age, political ideology – or something as simple as devotion to a sports team.  In fact, the differences between groups may be deliberately emphasized or even amplified over time, thus serving to define their distinct identities.  “Us” becomes defined as “not them”.

Given the universal tendency of human beings to form social groups, it would appear to be a crucial aspect of human nature – so crucial that membership in such groups becomes part of the most basic sense of self.  In other words, self identity becomes determined by group identity.  The question of “who are you?” is answered, in large part, by reference to nationality, race, religion, occupation, and all the other varieties of group membership.  Thus the beliefs of the group become part of the beliefs of the individual; the behavior of the group becomes part of the behavior of the individual; the success or failure of the group becomes part of the perceived success or failure of the individual.  Further, a given person may be part of many different groups simultaneously, and so involved in many kinds of us, as well as distinguished from just as many kinds of them, the importance and meaning of each differentiation varying according to the situation at hand and the prevailing attitude.

Henri Tajfel (again) and John Turner introduced “social identity theory” as a formal way of explaining the effect of group membership on self identity.  The theory holds that there is a continuum of social behavior extending from the purely interpersonal (between individuals) to the purely intergroup (between social groups); that in any real social situation, behavior will be determined by some mixture of the two.  Further, that differentiation between groups arises from the inherent tendency of people to categorize themselves and others according to race, nationality, and so forth; that people tend to adopt the identity of any group they are in; and that in making comparisons, an individual’s own group will tend to be viewed more favorably than other groups, with differences between the individual’s group and others being maximized, and differences between members belonging to the same group being minimized.

It might also be noted that a relationship exists, under certain circumstances, between group membership and territoriality.  It is very common for creatures, both social and non-social, to be territorial in their behavior, for basic reasons of survival: a territory provides food, a place of habitation, access to mates – in short, various crucial resources – and often must be defended from encroachment.  In the particular case of the human race, it would appear that a wide range of territorial behavior can be exhibited, depending on environmental conditions.  Where resources are unpredictable and scarce, territoriality will be low, as populations are highly dispersed and wide-ranging, and any attempt to defend an area would be of no significant benefit, besides being impracticable.  On the other hand, where resources are predictable and dense the opposite will be true – territoriality will be very high among the thickly settled populations that result, with individual and communal ownership of land precisely defined.  This latter is, of course, the situation brought about, after a long period of development, by the agricultural revolution that commenced at the end of the last ice age.  Thus the land occupied by a social group may become intimately associated with it, part of its sacred heritage, indeed its very identity, particularly if population density becomes so high that there is no place that members of the group can easily move (or escape) to; in which case those attached to the land must defend it.  The ultimate result is the national “homeland”, with its jealously guarded borders.

With the rise of large social groups, such as city-states, nations, and empires, also comes explicit belief in these groups.  The inherent tendency or instinct to become part of a social group may well be unconscious, resulting in an implicit, unspoken belief in the merits of the group.  However, with membership in a large group (and the wider horizon of knowledge it typically affords), also comes an awareness of the existence of other groups, which may be very different in language, religion, customs, and even race – as well as an awareness of any history of conflict with such groups.  Further, in a large group it is impossible for any given member to be closely acquainted with all the others, and thus have a personal bond with each of them.  Most will always remain strangers, so some other means must serve to provide a common sense of purpose.  Thus there arise explicit beliefs about a group, consciously formulated and stated, for the purpose of justifying it in relation to others, and maintaining its cohesion.

The explicit belief in a given social group of national extent would more commonly be described as patriotism or loyalty – that is, a particular instance of a type of belief termed nationalism.  Such belief usually asserts that a nation is exceptional, or of superior merit, in some manner; for example, that it might be exceptional in the matter of freedom; or exceptional in its culture; or in its religion; or in its traditions; or perhaps simply that it enjoys the favor of divine providence.  There may be some truth in the assertion, or there may be little or none, but in the end such considerations are functionally irrelevant, so long as the assertion is believed.

Thus, whatever the stated basis for patriotic conviction, it will commonly constitute a phenomenon of belief, as opposed to knowledge; the former will tend to greatly outweigh the latter, if in fact the latter exists at all.  Does an individual typically make a survey of the world’s various nations, logically decide which has the greatest merit, and then join its ranks?  Of course not.  While a few brave souls may actually make such a calculation and attempt to emigrate, the great majority will not even consider it, and in any case economic conditions are a vastly more important driver of emigration than ideology.  Further, there are all the connections of family, friends, and birthplace that must weigh heavily on any question of loyalty.  In actual fact, people are simply born into the population of a given nation, and due to this purely arbitrary circumstance, generally adopt the existing patriotic beliefs that inspire allegiance to it.

In other words, it could be said that belief in the group comes first, and any attempt to justify it only comes later; conclusion precedes evidence – or the verdict before the trial, as Lewis Carroll might have put it.  No logical consideration of evidence may ever occur, with justification for patriotic belief being made through a process of rationalization, rather than rationality.  But irrational or not, the impetus for such belief, perhaps unconscious or arising from instinct – what might be called “tribalism” – is extraordinarily powerful.  In fact, tribalism is generally more powerful than social class or ideology (as seen at the outbreak of the First World War, when the social democratic parties of the involved nations abandoned cross-border worker solidarity, each party instead supporting its own nation’s military efforts); more powerful than religion (when again, during the First World War, each establishment of religion typically supported the military program of its own nation); indeed, more powerful than any other social tendency, save perhaps that seen in the family itself (and on occasion even more powerful than that).  In other words, beliefs arising from tribalism become essential to an individual’s worldview, and indeed the worldviews of entire societies, thus establishing a tribal imperative.

So it is, then, that the reality before us is a humanity divided by a vast array of social groups and the conflicts between them: conflicts ranging from the wars of nations, to the brawls of sports factions.  Blue versus Green – how irrational and destructive the ancient conflict seems now!  But consider a more recent conflict, one of Red versus Blue, in a national populace transfixed by social issues … while the elite leaders of Red and Blue apparently remain in considerable (and perhaps clandestine) agreement concerning great issues of money and power: globalization, financial deregulation, corporate bailouts, privatization, and the pursuit of hegemonic supremacy…

Such is the legacy of us versus them.


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Sources

The experiments conducted by Henri Tajfel regarding group differentiation were reported in the article “Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination” (1970) Scientific American, 223, 96-102.

A chapter discussing the tenets of social identity theory, authored by Henri Tajfel and J.C. Turner, appears in the book Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by S. Worchel and L. W. Austin.

Evidence for the relationship between territoriality and environment was presented in a paper by Rada Dyson-Hudson and Eric Alden Smith of Cornell University: “Human Territoriality: and Ecological Reassessment”, published in the American Anthropologist (1978) 80, 21-41.


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A Personal Afterword

I first came across the conflict of Blue versus Green when I was very much younger, in the popular histories written by Will and Ariel Durant.  Yet in spite of whatever lesson that conflict might have taught, I remained a true red-white-and-blue patriot, a believer in the exceptionalism of the United States, just as I was a believer in every respect.  As was the case with my religious beliefs, however, troublesome questions began to arise as time went by – the war in Vietnam being an early and principal source of such questions, as it was for many others.

News of the massacre at My Lai became public in 1969, and the reaction to it by some of the students at my school was very interesting.  The stated object of the war was to defeat the oppression of Communism and deliver freedom to the Vietnamese; in other words, a goal of high idealism.  Yet a considerable number of my fellow students defended the perpetrators of the massacre as soldiers who were obliged to follow orders; that if they hadn’t followed orders, they would have been in danger from their superiors or comrades; that it was impossible to distinguish the enemy from civilians in the populace – and all of them might be potential enemies, anyway.  Besides, the United States had never yet lost a war, and we had to support the troops.

Of course, such attitudes were also common outside of my school.  When Lt. William Calley was convicted for the massacre at My Lai, none other than Jimmy Carter, then governor of Georgia, responded by asking members of the public to display support for the war in Vietnam and the other servicemen there, by driving with their headlights on for a week.  A public survey conducted by Harvard at the time found that two thirds of those questioned said that most people would shoot unarmed civilians if ordered to do so; in fact, half would be ready to pull the trigger themselves, if acting under orders.

Thus the supposed purpose of the war began to shed its idealistic veneer, and became decidedly tribal in aspect.  When push came to shove any high-minded principles were instantly forgotten, and the great goal simply became one of defeating the enemy, employing any means at hand.  Naive as I was, I was shocked at this development.  How could it be that the noble-minded policy our leaders had announced, promulgated in the name of freedom and justice, really meant so little?  That the morality that people paid lip service to was so very different from what they felt they might actually do?

And so my belief in national exceptionalism began to fade, while other ideas slowly began to form.


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“Why do the nations so furiously rage together, and why do the people imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth rise up, and the rulers take counsel together against the Lord, and against His Anointed.”

– Psalms 2:1-2; Acts 4: 25-26; Handel’s Messiah, Part II, Scene 6