5. The Face of Power
or, What is Seen When the Mask Falls Away
“All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks. But in each event – in the living act, the undoubted deed – there, some unknown but still reasoning thing puts forth the mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask. If man will strike, strike through the mask! How can the prisoner reach outside except by thrusting through the wall?”
– so sayeth Ahab: in Moby-Dick; or, The Whale, Chapter 36, by Herman Melville
A Case Study
The most astonishing example of an ascent to power in the last century – in fact, in any century – may be observed in the career of an individual embodying the qualities of a decorated war veteran, uncompromising patriot, promoter of national security, and supremely charismatic leader: namely, the erstwhile Fuhrer of the Greater German Reich, Adolf Hitler.
Outwardly nothing more than a social derelict in the years preceding the First World War, he began to find a place for himself during that cataclysm, eventually being awarded two Iron Crosses, first and second class. An even greater purpose claimed him in the chaos that followed the war, when he joined a newly formed political group that later became the NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei – that is, the Nazi party). He soon rose to become leader of the party by virtue of being its chief public figure and orator, as well as controlling its newspaper; further, he served as a conduit for secret funding of the group with money from the German army, which had been initiated through Ernst Rohm, co-founder of the party’s armed militia (which later became the Sturmabteilung or SA – the brownshirts).
Resentment over the foreign occupation of the Ruhr, which took place in January 1923, along with the continuing state of political and economic turmoil in Germany, inspired the NSDAP and its leader to mount the infamous putsch (coup) attempt of the following November. This daring move ended, however, as a miserable failure. In its aftermath, Hitler became convinced that the true path to power lay through legalistic methods, at least at the higher levels of the political structure (though the SA was still to have a crucial role in politics at the level of the street). The support of leading industrialists was cultivated and a number of them responded, while such socialistic elements as remained in the party were steadily curbed.
It was only in 1930 that the NSDAP became a mass movement. This was reflected in the number of seats it held in the Reichstag (the legislature of the postwar Weimar government): no more than 12 in 1928, but 107 in 1930, and 230 by July 1932. The hour of the party had come, courtesy not only of the crash of 1929, but the response to it by Weimar’s Bruning government: namely, austerity and deflation, which had resulted in an unemployment rate of nearly 30 percent. The terrible distress of the economic depression was the final straw for the people of Germany, heaped as it was upon the calamity of the First World War, the political chaos of its aftermath, the punitive Treaty of Versailles, the burden of crushing reparations to be paid, and the infamous episode of hyperinflation that followed. The promise of the party was simply this: to set the nation on a new course. (Or perhaps, it might be observed (and not entirely in a spirit of mordant humor), “to make it great again”…)
Even so, the absolute dominance that Hitler sought continued to elude him. The NSDAP had become the most powerful political party in Germany, but it still did not enjoy a legislative majority. In fact, in the elections of November 1932 it lost 34 seats in the Reichstag (partly due to industrialists withholding their financial support, at the instigation of Chancellor von Papen). Hitler’s response was to agree to form a coalition government (which he had heretofore refused to do), having supposedly been “tamed” by the machinations of von Papen and elements of the established order, who sought to use him for their own purposes (including the establishment of their particular version of authoritarian government). Thus he was appointed Chancellor by President Hindenburg in January 1933, and fellow party members Hermann Goering and Wilhelm Frick were given seats in the 11 member cabinet, while von Papen held the position of Vice-Chancellor.
However, once in his new position, Hitler immediately resumed his drive for total power – though regarded in some quarters as little more than a buffoon, he had, in actuality, been severely underestimated. Frick had been installed in the position of Minister of the Interior, which gave him authority over the national police, while Goering controlled the police administration of Prussia; they immediately set about replacing uncooperative law enforcement officials with party members. Meanwhile, the storm troopers of the SA were unleashed, disrupting the meetings and activities of the Communist, Socialist, and even Center parties in often violent clashes. Shortly thereafter the Reichstag building burned down in an arson fire that was apparently set by a madman (but was blamed on the Communists), whereupon Hindenburg issued a decree suspending personal liberties. All members of the Reichstag who were Communists were subject to arrest, along with thousands of others.
There now followed the Gleichschaltung, or period of “coordination” (coordination, that is, of the institutions of society with the NSDAP, in the sense of coming under the party’s control). At the level of the street this commenced through sheer force: the offices of opposition trade unions, newspapers, and local governments were taken over by the SA, unhindered by the police – in fact, members of the SA had actually been enrolled as auxiliary police. In the Reichstag the party had come to hold 288 seats, which would still have been short of a majority, except that all Communist and some 26 Socialist members had been prevented from sitting. An Enabling Act was then submitted that would give the government administration – essentially, Hitler – the right to rule by decree without involvement of the Reichstag. It required a two-thirds majority to pass, but even the Catholic Center Party supported it, the final vote being 441 to 94 in favor. Only the Social Democrats were opposed, and were rewarded by being outlawed shortly thereafter. In fact, all political parties other than the NSDAP were abolished by July 1933.
The most serious challenge to Hitler’s power now came from within the Nazi organization itself. Calls were increasingly heard for a “second revolution” in a situation already disordered with unsanctioned violence instigated by the SA militia; in fact, in terms of personnel, the SA and its adjuncts had come to be more than forty times larger than the German army (which was severely restricted in size by the Versailles Treaty), and its rabble-rousing Chief of Staff, Ernst Rohm, appeared to suggest that the army be integrated into it – a proposal which was intolerable, as it would have turned the military’s high command against Hitler. Meanwhile, conservatives such as von Papen continued to scheme for establishment of an authoritarian government of their own, while attempting to get the support of President Hindenburg. And so, to eliminate these threats to his supremacy, Hitler ordered the “Night of the Long Knives” at the end of June 1934, in which the leaders of the SA, and many others (such as former Chancellor Kurt Schleicher) were exterminated by the SS (Schutzstaffel). The SS had originated as Hitler’s bodyguard, and under Heinrich Himmler became a powerful organization, directly loyal to the person of the Fuhrer.
In return for his decapitation of the SA, the military permitted Hitler to assume the presidency, after the death of Hindenburg in August 1934. Now occupying the combined offices of Chancellor and President, Hitler not only had the formal power to rule by decree, but was supreme commander of the army as well. Further, under the process of Gleichschaltung, all trade unions, chambers of commerce, and farm organizations had been placed under the direct control of the party, with many of their leaders being arrested and sent to concentration camps. The army, on the other hand, had not been subjected to complete “coordination” with the NSDAP, and was pleased with Hitler’s plans to vastly increase the size of the military. As for the heads of large industrial enterprises, they retained control of their businesses and their profits, with troublesome trade unions having been eliminated; the economy was soon subjected to strict import controls, but these contributed to the growth of domestic industry, which was also boosted by rapidly increasing armament production.
Thus, by August 1934, Adolf Hitler had achieved control of the German state. His next objective lay outside its borders.
One of the major aims of Hitler’s foreign policy was to unite all the ethnic Germans of Europe in a single nation, and the first significant step toward this goal came in January 1935, as the result of a plebiscite in the Saar. This territory, part of Germany before the First World War, had been administered by the League of Nations since the end of the conflict, and its extensive coal mines controlled by France. Voting in the plebiscite was overseen by an international peacekeeping force, and the final result was the approval of reunification with Germany by a 90 percent majority.
That the regime had regained the Saar with such overwhelming approval was a notable success for it. The next development was more ominous, for in March 1935 the rearmament of Germany was announced, along with the introduction of conscription. The Treaty of Versailles, which formally ended the First World War, had severely limited the size of the German military, and entirely prohibited an air force. However, the postwar Weimar government had immediately instituted a clandestine, if circumscribed, program of rearmament that violated these strict limits; and the World Disarmament Conference of 1932 established the principle that Germany might have the right to a larger military establishment, subject to negotiation. Hitler’s openly announced and unilateral policy took the matter much further, and while it provoked protests, there was no opposition by force on the part of its neighbors. In fact, Britain soon negotiated a new treaty, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935, which permitted the German fleet to have up to 35 percent of the total tonnage of the Royal Navy, greatly exceeding the Versailles limits – which had simply been ignored by both parties. It might also be noted that the program of rearmament eventually brought the German economy to full employment, solidifying public support of the regime.
In March 1936 Hitler made his most audacious move to date, when he ordered the remilitarization of the Rhineland. This region of western Germany had essentially been a neutral zone in which military forces and fortifications were forbidden, as established not only by the Treaty of Versailles, but also by the crucial Locarno Treaties of 1925. Since its existence obstructed possible invasions of France or Belgium, any violation of it was to be regarded as a hostile act. A recent bilateral pact between France and the Soviet Union, however, allowed the claim to be made that the remilitarization was a defensive response; and in any event France was in the midst of a financial crisis, which discouraged the possibility of a full mobilization of its army, a very costly undertaking which it was thought would be necessary to stop the Germans. The general attitude in Britain, moreover, was that Hitler’s act was not particularly harmful, indeed that it was an inevitable reoccupation by Germany of its own territory (though one that ought to have been negotiated beforehand). Thus, when a mere 19 battalions (3000 soldiers) of the German army entered the Rhineland, no action taken against them – in spite of the fact that the French army at the time was much larger than the forces Hitler could muster, and that the Chief of the German General Staff, General Ludwig Beck, had stated that the army could not defend the nation against a French attack. Once again Hitler’s gamble had paid off, and his popularity soared at home.
After the remilitarization of the Rhineland the regime continued to rapidly strengthen and improve its military forces, including the construction of the Siegfried Line fortifications, which largely nullified the threat of invasion by France, and thus considerably reduced French influence in eastern Europe. Also, upon the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, German air and armored units (including the Condor Legion) were immediately sent to aid the Nationalists, thereby gaining important operational experience. On the diplomatic front the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan was signed in November 1936, an anti-Communist alliance that was joined by Italy a year later, thereby forming the group later known as the Axis Powers.
In March 1938 Hitler’s drive to unite all ethnic Germans achieved a new and very considerable success, when Austria was annexed to Greater Germany by the political maneuver known as the Anschluss. In the past there had been substantial sentiment in Austria in favor of a union between the two nations, especially after the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that resulted from the First World War; but such a union had been specifically prohibited by the Versailles Treaty. In 1934, with the encouragement of Hitler’s newly installed regime, the Austrian version of the Nazi party (the DNSAP) had attempted a putsch to force the issue, in the course of which Austria’s chancellor Dollfuss was assassinated. In the end, however, the coup was quashed by forces loyal to the government, and Italy precluded any possible German invasion by threatening to intervene. In the years that followed the Austrian Nazis continued to engage in terror attacks against the government, and rapidly gained in strength with the assistance of unrelenting political and economic pressure from Germany. Finally, in 1938, Hitler again threatened to invade, after having reached an understanding with Italy’s Mussolini – and this time the Austrian government was forced to give way. Facing no resistance (in fact, receiving the welcome of cheering crowds), German troops entered Austria to enforce the Anschluss.
The next target of Hitler’s program was the nation of Czechoslovakia, which had been formed from portions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War. The western area of Czechoslovakia, known as the Sudetenland, bordered on Germany and was heavily populated by ethnic Germans, with a local branch of the Nazi movement (the Sudeten German Party) having grown into prominence there. Immediately after the Austrian Anschluss was concluded, demands were first made for autonomy for the Sudetenland, then for its union with Germany. The government of Czechoslovakia, under president Edvard Benes, was fully prepared to resist, but the British position was that Germany’s demands were not unreasonable, and the French acquiesced in this. Furthermore, neighboring Poland and Hungary were both eager to seize parts of Czechoslovakia that were populated by ethnic Poles and Hungarians. Thus, surrounded by enemies, under threat of invasion by Germany, and lacking the support of the western powers, the Czech government was forced to submit. In September 1938, a conference of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy (without the participation of Czechoslovakia) produced the Munich Agreement, by which the Sudetenland was ceded to Germany, in return for the promise of no further territorial demands from the Hitler regime.
The loss of the Sudetenland was catastrophic for Czechoslovakia, since its border defenses and much of its heavy industry were concentrated there. Moreover, Hitler had no intention of honoring his agreement to seek no further territory. In March 1939 the German army entered and occupied what remained of the crippled Czechoslovak state, aside from eastern portions that went to Hungary, and a district that had been taken by Poland. The Germans thereby gained not only the territory involved, but also the Czech munitions industry (which was sizable) and the weapons of its army.
With the total dismemberment and assimilation of Czechoslovakia, the western powers had been given full confirmation that the Hitler regime was much more dangerous than had originally been supposed. Britain and France pledged to support Poland against German attack, but in the end did very little to impede the invasion that eventually took place. The Second World War thus commenced on September 1, 1939, with Hitler’s armies winning spectacular victories in its opening phases – victories which gave him power over the greater part of Europe.
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The question of power – who possesses it, and how it is used – is the central issue in political behavior, and thus an inescapable factor in human affairs. In this regard the career of Adolf Hitler, from the First World War to his initial triumphs in the Second, constitutes a lesson without equal. No individual has ever held more power, before or since; or gained it so rapidly from a humble station; or employed it to such monstrous effect. By August 31, 1939, he had not only gained mastery of the German state, but rebuilt its military strength and enlarged its territories in an epic display of Machtpolitik (power politics) that nevertheless avoided an outbreak of general warfare. Thereafter, when he did commence the war he so resolutely sought, his armies swiftly crushed those of his opponents, and along with his allies and puppets (Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, and Vichy) conquered and occupied the territories of Poland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Baltic States, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and most of North Africa – the advance of his forces being checked only at the English Channel and the Nile, and finally turned back at the gates of Moscow.
This example, dark though it may be, will nevertheless illuminate the principles of power in the most effective manner possible, as set out below. Illustration will also be supplied by additional cases drawn from the record of human events, along with commentary from the works of Niccolo Machiavelli and Oswald Spengler.
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The Principles of Power
I. Power is the ability to command: to influence or control people. Its may be employed to enforce order, to allocate resources, to organize effort, to make war, or simply to aggrandize itself – that is, to gain more power. Its methods may involve violence or the threat of violence; persuasion by argument, example, inspiration, or indoctrination; the assertion of expertise, real or imagined; subterfuge, misdirection, or blatant lies; promises of protection from perceived threats; appeals to ethnic or national solidarity; and the distribution of rewards, for sustenance or gratification, including the ever reliable incentive of the payoff. The ability to command is always the essence of a power-wielder, and stands quite apart from any conventions of social custom.
In tracing the course of his rise to power, it can be observed that Adolf Hitler employed every one of the methods described above. Certainly violence and its threat were involved: the stormtroopers of the SA, for example, were essential to the suppression of opposition groups and the execution of the Gleichschaltung. Of course, the SA often operated with the tacit consent (if not collusion) of various authorities of the Weimar period, demonstrating Hitler’s successful use of persuasion, which convinced elements of the established order that their purposes might be served by his advancement. The attacks by the Nazis on Communist and socialist groups were regarded with favor in high places, permitting greater power to be attained by the party, which in turn was employed to achieve even more effective suppression of its opponents. Thus the onslaught of the NSDAP came from two directions at once, above and below, each reinforcing the effect of the other. Hitler also recognized the importance of more widely effective forms of persuasion from the very beginning of his career, quickly gaining control of the party’s newspaper, and eventually becoming a spellbinding orator himself; while the contributions of his master of propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, hardly need to be emphasized.
Regarding a claim to power by expertise, there could be no more forceful statement of it than the Fuhrerprinzip (leader principle), by which Hitler asserted a superior ability to direct the affairs of the state and its people. This doctrine held that the Fuhrer was the living incarnation of ultimate authority, above any written or customary law, or even conventional morality. Against those who did not accept such claims, or suspected the regime of malevolence, there could always be employed the tactics of misdirection and outright lies, of which Hitler was a master, especially in the realm of international diplomacy. He was always ready to declare his desire for peace, to make any guarantee or sign any agreement that served his immediate purpose, only to repudiate it later – and then offer to engage in negotiations over new demands.
Germany had certainly suffered a great defeat in the First World War, which resulted in heavy reparations being imposed upon it; and also experienced serious turmoil in its aftermath, which threatened the existing social order. Thus Hitler’s promise to protect the nation – and ethnic Germans, wherever they might reside – from their enemies, both foreign and domestic (and real and imagined) generated much of his public backing, as did his program of supreme cultural solidarity: to unite all the Germans in Europe under one all-embracing state.
Finally, Hitler’s regime was willing and able to provide material benefits to encourage its support. The rearmament programs that were undertaken greatly reduced unemployment and helped revive the German economy (much as similar efforts in the United States eventually brought it to full employment as well). As previously noted, the industrialists of Germany often received preferential treatment, and of course rearmament increased their revenues. But the regime went even further, to the extent of paying outright bribes, especially to high ranking military officers, who received cash payments, property, and even large estates – which usually proved quite effective in ensuring their loyalty.
Of course, Hitler’s brutal and unbridled drive for power is by no means unique in the record of history. Another example of darkly spectacular character, this time set in the ancient world, was described by Niccolo Machiavelli in Chapter VIII of The Prince:
“Agathocles, the Sicilian, became King of Syracuse not only from a private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. And although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time raised the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with the possession of Africa.”
II. Power is exerted through organization. The power of the lone individual is quite limited, but may be increased by membership in an organized group with a common goal (actual or merely asserted). Further, an individual who is in a position to command an organized group possesses greatly leveraged power; and if members of that group can in turn command other groups, power will be leveraged further still. Thus an emperor may command an empire.
It is self-evident, then, that power requires supporters – those who, for whatever reason (opportunism, patriotism, ideology, faith, security, or even fear), serve to promote its interests. Of course, the individuals who are part of a power structure will have their own particular interests, which will vary to some degree; it is when these interests align that action may be taken most effectively. Thus, although ability is a desirable trait in a supporter, loyalty is usually valued even more highly, as it produces obedience – and disloyalty is more likely to be punished than failure. The loyal supporter will usually receive protection and rewards, even under adverse circumstances, so as to encourage similar support from others.
Adolph Hitler exploited the principle of organization in ways that are often not clearly understood. He was of course the supreme leader of the Reich, and as such its ultimate authority, but there was also considerable delegation of authority within the NSDAP (Nazi party) to lesser officials, which led to competition and infighting among them, as they carved out their own spheres of influence (a policy with overtones of “survival of the fittest”, and perhaps also “divide and conquer”). As for the party itself, it maintained a completely dominant position, its presence permeating almost every aspect of German society, forming a state within the state that was loyal to the person of the Fuhrer. Hitler’s regime controlled the military (the members of which had been required to take an oath of loyalty to him in 1934), the government bureaucracy, the police, the press, the schools, and organizations of every kind, while the influence of the churches had been largely neutralized. And on those occasions when Hitler issued a Fuhrerbefehl (leader directive), it was a command to the entire apparatus of the state that superseded any other consideration.
It might also be noted that support for the Fuhrer was not only voluntary in many cases, but positively enthusiastic. For example, it was war minister Werner von Blomberg and ministry chief Walther von Reichenau who, on their own initiative, instituted the military’s loyalty oath to Hitler – who reportedly was quite surprised at the development.
As to rewards bestowed for loyal support, even in the face of failure or controversy, several instructive cases might be found in a more recent era. For example, in 1992 President Bush (senior) pardoned six officials, including former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams, for offenses committed in the course of the Iran-Contra affair, which had been an extremely notorious scandal. Moreover, far from being stigmatized, Abrams was later rewarded with the post of Deputy National Security Advisor in the administration of President Bush (junior). And of course the latter Bush also commuted the sentence of “Scooter” Libby in the matter of the Valerie Plame incident (though even this gesture did not prove sufficient for President Trump, who later granted Libby a full pardon).
Yet another informative example from the administration of the younger Bush may be seen in the case of Paul Wolfowitz, former Deputy Secretary of Defense. He was instrumental (along with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld) in establishing the Office of Special Plans (OSP) in the Pentagon, for the purpose of obtaining evidence that the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein possessed immense amounts of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and supported Al Qaeda terrorism – without ever seriously questioning whether such allegations were actually true. (In fact, subsequent developments demonstrated they were not). Further, Wolfowitz claimed that Iraq’s own oil revenues would completely pay for its reconstruction of Iraq after its invasion, and belittled the assertion that several hundred thousand troops would be required for an effective occupation of the nation. (Again, these positions were contradicted by the actual results of the 2003 invasion, which had a cost that will eventually amount to trillions of dollars – not to mention the cost in human life.) And what was the consequence for the promoter of such an astounding series of policies? Namely, that he was appointed to the presidency of the World Bank.
In contrast, there might be considered the case of one John Kiriakou, who revealed that waterboarding had been involved in CIA interrogation efforts. Largely as a consequence, he was prosecuted by the Obama administration in 2013 and sentenced to a term in prison – thereby becoming the only person to be jailed in connection with the CIA’s torture program. In fact, one of the principal operatives within that program, Gina Haspel, was thereafter confirmed as Director of the CIA (providing irrefutable evidence that irony, especially of the blackest kind, is by no means dead).
Thus may be seen the meaning of service to power: that loyalty to its aims will usually excuse the most questionable conduct, or even costly blunders (costly to the public at large, that is, though perhaps not the ruling order); while defiance, even in a principled cause, will be harshly punished indeed.
III. Power is required in a society to the degree of its size and development, which ultimately results in the establishment of the state. In a large and densely populated society, the problem of relations between strangers becomes prevalent, along with increasing difficulty in suppressing destructive elements. Disputes, enforcement of agreements, and the consequences of antisocial behavior must somehow be dealt with – not only among individuals, but also between organized groups. Since a consensus of the entire population is often impossible, and in any case implementation of policy must fall to those capable of it, power is exerted, through the state, to produce the necessary resolution.
Further, apart from the matter of relations within a society, there also arises the question of relations between societies, particularly when they come into conflict. Before an agreement can be negotiated, there must exist the power to enter into one; before war can be prosecuted, there must exist the power to command. Thus conflict dictates the necessity of power, and war, as the ultimate expression of conflict, leads to power’s greatest development – or, as Randolph Bourne observed in 1918: “For war is essentially the health of the State.”
To continue with the example of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, its result provides a clear illustration of the consequences of a sudden dissolution of the organized power of the state. The regime of Saddam Hussein was oppressive, but in the wake of his fall, and the suppression of the ruling Baathist party – with no truly effective replacement being made – the scale of violence in the land expanded enormously, accompanied by a general degradation of society and its infrastructure. Looting and corruption became rampant; armed militias roved at will; a vicious civil war erupted between Sunni and Shia factions; while Iraq’s ancient Christian communities were decimated. Finally, there even arose a jihadist “nation” in the form of ISIS, which was only suppressed after great effort.
And as a simple point, it can safely be stated that no nation of any size has ever existed in the absence of organized power.
As Oswald Spengler observed in Chapter IV of Man and Technics:
“With collective doing the decisive step is taken from organic to organized existence, from living in natural to living in artificial groupings, from the pack to the people, the tribe, the social class, the State.
“And out of the combats of individual carnivores there has sprung war, as an enterprise of tribe against tribe, with leaders and followers, with organized marches, surprises, and actions. Out of the annihilation of the vanquished springs the law that is imposed upon the vanquished. Human law is ever a law of the stronger to which the weaker must conform, and this law, considered as something permanently valid between tribes, constitutes ‘peace’. Such a peace also prevails within the tribe, so that its forces may be available for action outwards; the State is the internal order of a people for its external purpose.”
IV. Power inevitably concentrates in a society of any size. That is, it is always wielded by an ingroup of limited membership, a formally constituted part of which comprises the government of the state. This cannot be avoided, since situations requiring the employment of power arise incessantly, sometimes on short notice, and involve a myriad of consequences – rendering said employment feasible only by persons who are familiar with its established mechanisms and constraints, and have agreed upon a framework that permits effective decisions to be made. Once such an ingroup arises, it will then tend to promote the interests and beliefs of its members, gain control of access to information, and reward loyalty to itself, thereby entrenching its own position. Or, as Robert Michels put it in his book of 1911, Political Parties: “Who says organization, says oligarchy.”
However, apart from the tendencies described by Michel’s “Iron Law of Oligarchy”, concentration is promoted by another circumstance: namely, that some have a greater desire for power than others, even amounting to a compulsion in certain cases, to be satisfied by any means at hand. After accounting for the advantages of birthright or association, those with the greatest desire and ability to achieve power will be, by far, the individuals most likely to attain it.
Thus in every society of substantial size there arises a ruling class. It may be hereditary, develop through military, financial, or administrative advancement, or rely on popular support, but it always exists (regardless of any pretense otherwise). The disparity in size between the ruling class and the population will tend to be most extreme in the largest societies; a single autocrat can suffice to govern anything from a small tribe to a massive empire (albeit with the aid of subordinates).
An interesting observation on the relationship between the ruling class and public policy was made by Hermann Goering, when interviewed by Gustave Gilbert at Nuremberg in 1946 (as quoted in the book Nuremberg Diary):
“Why, of course, the people don’t want war,” Goering shrugged. “Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece. Naturally, the common people don’t want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship.”
“There is one difference,” I pointed out. “In a democracy the people have some say in the matter through their elected representatives, and in the United States only Congress can declare wars.”
“Oh, that is all well and good, but, voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country.”
Once again the 2003 invasion of Iraq comes to mind, as a perfect corroboration of Goering’s statement. It saw fabrication of cause at the highest levels of government; dissemination of that fabrication by an ethically (and professionally) derelict press; and wholesale consumption of the fabrication by an otherwise ignorant and unquestioning public. All echoing a certain incident in the Gulf of Tonkin that took place decades earlier … to which, one might add, that Mr. Gilbert’s comment on the sole power of Congress to declare war now seems almost laughable. In fact, in considering the history of the origin of wars, it may be possible to identify an important doctrine, which could be termed the Goering Principle: that the public can usually be brought to support a war as “justified”, even in a democracy, so long as the ruling order makes sufficient effort to provide (or invent) such justification.Oswald Spengler also offered some observations on the relationship between democracy and the ruling order – caustic and perhaps a bit overstated, yet at the same time conveying more than a little truth (the sort of statement, it might be said, that was typical of him). From The Decline of the West (Volume 2, Chapter XI: the State and History):
“If by ‘democracy’ we mean the form which the Third Estate as such wishes to impart to public life as a whole, it must be concluded that democracy and plutocracy are the same thing under the two aspects of wish and actuality, theory and practice, knowing and doing. It is the tragic comedy of the world-improvers’ and freedom-teachers’ desperate fight against money that they are ipso facto assisting money to be effective. Respect for the big number – expressed in the principles of equality for all, natural rights, and universal suffrage – is just as much a class-ideal of the unclassed as freedom of opinion (and more particularly freedom of the press) is so. These are ideals, but in actuality the freedom of public opinion involves the preparation of public opinion, which costs money; and the freedom of the press brings with it the question of the ownership of the press, which again is a matter of money; and with the franchise comes electioneering, in which he who pays the piper calls the tune. The representatives of the ideas look at one side only, while the representatives of money operate with the other. The concepts of Liberalism and Socialism are set in effective motion only by money. It was the Equites, the big-money party, which made Tiberius Gracchus’ popular movement possible at all; and as soon as that part of the reforms that was advantageous to them had been successfully legalized, they withdrew and the movement collapsed.”
In fact, regardless of whether democracy and plutocracy are actually the same thing, it might be said that the highest court of the United States has, of late, labored tirelessly to make it so.
Then too, while Spengler observed that the services of the fourth estate might be available for purchase, he evidently did not see the possibility that the press, for its own advantage, might seek profit in conflict and partisan sensationalism – which was the case, over a century ago, for Hearst’s promotion of the Spanish-American War, and in 2016 was true for the massive and continuous coverage of Donald Trump’s campaign for the presidency. Indeed, as Les Moonves, chief executive officer of CBS, said of the network’s air time for Trump: “It may not be good for America, but it’s damn good for CBS ... the money’s rolling in, and this is fun.” It might also be noted that a career in journalism, as in any other field, is rarely hindered by offering service to power. Thus, in the end, the press may buy off itself.As for the individual desire for power, it is hard to imagine anyone with a greater determination to attain it than the Fuhrer of the Greater German Reich – and attain it he did, under circumstances that abetted his rise. Ultimately, however, he was unable to maintain his position of authority for much more than a decade, thereafter coming to a catastrophic end. This may have been due to the fact that he did not seem to desire power purely for its own sake, but also for its usefulness in enforcing his extreme (and sometimes self-defeating) aims and prejudices. If he had been satisfied with something less than absolute power, less tied to any defined policies, he would have more closely resembled the leaders of other nations – whose single-minded climbs to power often take place in democracies as well as dictatorships – and thus died peacefully in bed, rather than by suicide, in the midst of a nation in ruins.
V. Power knows no law that supersedes its own ends. It is the object of a game for which there are no rules, with supremacy as the prize for success, and submission or destruction the reward for failure. Thus it is not inherent in power to be governed by an idea of morality, or the general good, or a particular belief system – certainly not any legal fiction. Such considerations may serve as a rationale for power, and might even be pursued as important subsidiary objectives; indeed, power may seek to legalize its deeds in order to justify them. In the end, however, power itself must remain its own primary goal, for it can continue to exist only so long as it overcomes the endless challenges of competitors, employing whatever means are necessary to that end, regardless of other considerations. The moment it fails in this is the moment its decline begins. Thus power is inherently sociopathic, in that its ultimate aim must always be to serve itself, and itself above all, rather than any prescription of human society. As the maxim has it, “power corrupts”, which is simply another way of stating this sociopathic tendency.
Therefore it might be observed that power is not an instrument of the law; rather, the law is an instrument of power. Furthermore, that power does not have its source in institutions or traditions of any kind, however hallowed these may be. Formal organizations and established custom may provide a framework and mechanism for the exercise of power, but it always has its true source in the persons who actually wield it. The result is a reality that is not accurately described by a system of independent branches of government, or even separate spheres of business, military, and public administration, but by a continuous web of power that extends across institutional boundaries, exercised by individuals who share personal connections of influence and outlook, and who often occupy positions of authority in more than one sphere, consecutively or even concurrently.
It might also be noted that as concerns its own legitimacy, power can never be wrong. It may occasionally admit to a “mistake” (particularly if a blunder becomes too obvious to pretend it is something else) – but of course this mistake cannot actually be “wrong”, as it was committed with only the “best of intentions”.
Concerning power’s employment of the legal code for its own aims, one of the most notorious examples must surely be the Nuremberg Laws of the Hitler regime, which declared Jews to be enemies of the state. But of course there are many similar instances to be found, among them the race laws that existed in the United States as late as the 1960s, which served as a useful model for those authoring the legislation of the Third Reich.
The aims and means of power were also examined by Niccolo Machiavelli, who became famous – or, perhaps, infamous – for his observations on this subject, most notoriously for the necessity of behavior, on the part of a ruler, that would otherwise be considered unlawful or even iniquitous. The following is quoted from Chapter XVIII of The Prince:
“Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience has been that those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. You must know there are two ways of contesting, the one by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second … Of this endless modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.
“But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to his wishes, because he well understood this side of mankind.
“Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite.”
(The Alexander the Sixth referred to above was actually Pope Alexander VI, a.k.a. Rodrigo Borgia, father of Cesare and Lucrezia. He evidently exhibited great skill in the timeless art of telling people what they want to hear – and then doing something quite different.)
And more, from Chapter XIX:
“There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many…
“But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself—it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles—you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do you harm.”
A more recent example is that of Richard M. Nixon, who remarked that “Well, when the president does it, that means that it is not illegal,” during an interview with David Frost in 1977. In other words, he was stating the opinion that nation’s chief executive had the inherent power to operate outside the law, if the situation was judged to warrant such (as determined by the administration itself, of course). This brings to mind the observation of Carl Schmitt, the noted jurist of the Hitler regime, that “sovereign is he who decides on the exception” – the exception, in this case, being one made to the law, supposedly in the public interest. Schmitt’s thesis was that decisive action by government required a dictatorial element in its framework, though in the case of his own government the results would seem to have been less than exemplary. It is interesting to note that similar ideas appear to have motivated many of the legal opinions of John Yoo and other functionaries of the administration of the younger Bush, in the matter of the so-called “war on terror”.
The fall of Richard Nixon also illustrates the principle that power, if it is to be maintained in the face of challenge, must remain its own highest end. It has often been observed that if he had abandoned his closest advisors during the early stages of the Watergate scandal, allowing them to be charged with its blame, he would thereby have been spared the threat of impeachment, and simply served out the remainder of his term It is perhaps understandable that he remained committed to these advisors, for the circle of people that he felt he could trust was very small; however, in allowing this commitment to overcome the dictates of power, he brought disaster upon himself. And as previously mentioned, a similar example might be found in the downfall of Adolf Hitler, whose devotion to his own immoderate and often infamous aims, rather than power for its own sake, contributed to his end.
VI. Power selects its wielders. As noted above, some seek power more than others; but it is the nature of the seeker which decides if the goal is to actually be achieved. The most single-minded, ruthless, and shrewd in the pursuit of power will be those most likely to attain it – which does not imply that wanton violence and cruelty will be rewarded, rather that every action ought to be calibrated to the degree that it advances attainment of the goal, and remains justifiable in the face of common opinion, whatever its true nature.
However, inasmuch as power is sociopathic, so will its ardent pursuers often prove to be sociopaths. Though a disciplined and rational quest for power would be the sort most likely to succeed, a sociopath is likely to exhibit certain flaws of character, and being governed by ambition and raw desire (possibly accompanied by ungovernable passions), will commonly behave in manner not at all disciplined or rational. Thus, to avoid the censure of public opinion, those in power must often make every effort to conceal or camouflage their private lives and dealings; and through ill-advised actions, they may, on occasion, even undo themselves.
It is also implied that even where sociopathy does not initially exist, the very nature of power, and its relentless demands, might eventually induce such a condition in its wielder. In this, it may well be assisted by that most lethal of hazards: self-delusion. If power is exerted to enforce a desired end, opposition may arise, requiring greater power to overcome it, which in turn may induce increased opposition, necessitating acquisition of even more power – a spiral of pathology which ends with power being sought for its own sake, the original goal having been forgotten (if, indeed, its pursuit was of primary importance in the first place). Thus a desired end may become a delusion which obscures the reality of a drive for power.
It is clear that Adolf Hitler was indeed single-minded, ruthless, and shrewd in the pursuit of power, as set out above; which, along with the political and social conditions that favored his ascent, eventually resulted in his attainment of precisely what he sought – for a time.
Similar qualities may of course be seen in other individuals engaged in the pursuit of power, including those in political systems described as democracies; and, while it is by no means implied that the result will be as horrific, it can certainly be unfortunate in many respects. One such pursuer of power was Lyndon Baines Johnson, and an account of him was written by George Reedy, who joined Johnson’s senate staff in 1951, worked as an aide from 1960 onwards, and then served as his press secretary until 1965. Below are some quotations from his book Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir, published in 1982:
“There were a few key traits to his personality and it is unlikely that he shed them. As a human being he was a miserable person – a bully, sadist, lout, and egoist. He had no sense of loyalty (despite his protestations that it was a quality that he valued above all others) and he enjoyed tormenting those who had done the most for him. He seemed to take a special delight in humiliating those who had cast in their lot with him. It may well be that this was the result of a form of self-loathing in which he concluded that there had to be something wrong with anyone who would associate with him.” [from Chapter 16: The Aftermath]
However, Johnson’s behavior was not without its purpose:
“His lapses from civilized conduct were deliberate and usually intended to subordinate someone else to his will. He did disgusting things because he realized other people had to pretend that they did not mind. It was his method of bending them to his designs.” [again from Chapter 16: The Aftermath]
Nevertheless, what he thought and did was often not the product of willful dishonesty or even rational calculation:
“He had a remarkable capacity to convince himself that he held the principles he should hold at any given time, and there was something charming about the air of injured innocence with which he would treat anyone who brought forth evidence that he had held other views in the past. It was not an act. His whole life was lived in the present and he was tenacious in his conviction that history always conformed to current necessities…
“To complicate the picture, his own view of what had happened frequently shifted. To the outside world, this appeared as a form of mendacity. It is my firm belief, from close association over a number of years, that the man never told a deliberate lie. But he had a fantastic capacity to persuade himself that the ‘truth’ which was convenient for the present was the truth and anything that conflicted with it was the prevarication of enemies. He literally willed what was in his mind to be reality and, as he was a master at imposing his will upon the people, the society, and the world around him, he saw no reason for history to be exempt from the process.” [from Chapter 1: The Potemkin Village]
(The above might well be compared to the statement made by an unnamed aide to President Bush (junior) – generally attributed to Karl Rove – that “We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.” Which perhaps demonstrates the prevalence of such attitudes, and even megalomania, among the members of the ruling order. It is also interesting that LBJ had a remarkable talent for self-delusion, which may be a prime ingredient of such megalomania.)
And as for the loyal service rendered by Reedy and many others:
“Why the members of his staff stuck with him – including me – is a question I cannot answer to this day. It had something to do with a feeling that he was a truly great man and that we owed it to the country to put up with his rampages so he would be there when he was needed. The sentiment may sound squishy to those who have never been close to him but he was capable of generating incredible loyalty. Naturally, we put the best face on things that we could. We ascribed his tantrums to an inferiority complex. This gave us a feeling that at heart he was a modest man, unaware of his great gifts. In fact, he did have an inferiority complex. It was not, however, the whole explanation for the conduct of a very complicated man.” [from Chapter 6: A Philosophy of Life]
Thus it might be said that Johnson had a quality of manipulative charm, or personal force, or perhaps “charisma”, that is commonly seen in politicians – and is very often a characteristic of sociopaths. Also, many of those around him were convinced that he could accomplish great things in the public interest; and in many respects, it is likely that he did. He was instrumental in obtaining congressional approval for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and what might be considered the last important program of the “New Deal” – namely Medicare, which was instituted very effectively (at least as compared to “Obamacare”, with its inherent defects, not least of which is a guarantee of massive revenues for the private insurance industry). Johnson was genuinely committed to working for the public welfare in many of his policies, and for the underdog and disadvantaged in particular (at least insofar as he understood such things), which might have been due to the fact that he saw himself as an underdog fighting for his rightful place, having come from a prominent family that had fallen into decline. For these reasons, it would seem, his supporters in his immediate circle were willing to go to great lengths to conceal the truth of his personal nature. Concerning the election campaign of 1960:
“He handled himself brilliantly in public – especially during the crucial ‘whistle stop’ train tour which was unquestionably responsible for pulling a large chunk of the South back into the Democratic camp. This may have been the only campaign in history where the vice presidential candidate made an observable difference. Behind the scenes, however, the campaign was grinding agony for a staff which felt a duty to the campaign to keep the seamy side from showing. There were some terrible moments – drunken, aimless wanderings through a hotel corridor in Chicago (fortunately blocked off by police) in which he tried to crawl into the bed of the female correspondent (I got the impression as we led him away that he was seeking comfort, not sex); a wild drinking bout in El Paso in which he spent the night cursing and raving at a good friend; continuous torrents of abuse directed at his staff. It was amazing to watch him go out in public and make truly compelling speeches off-the-cuff after such episodes.” [from Chapter 13: Through the Shadows]
Then too, it may be that the inherently sociopathic nature of power itself eventually had an effect. Mr. Reedy felt Johnson’s performance in office to be quite admirable while he was filling out the remainder of Kennedy’s term as president, but that things became very different after he was elected in his own right in 1964:
“His presidential style changed overnight, and it was not a good change. In the United States, the election process contains within itself some elements of sanctification and I believe he advanced that concept to one of deification. He knew that he had “arrived” and he was going to make the most of it.” [from Chapter 14: Apotheosis]
And George Reedy was by no means the only notable individual who was aware of the true situation. From the Journals, 1952-2000, of Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., published in 2007:
“I took part with Bill Moyers, Jack Valenti, Eric Goldman, and Ted Sorensen (in Kansas City) in a National Education Television commentary. Afterward Bill and I went over to the Algonquin for a drink. We talked a bit about the problem of writing about Johnson. Bill said, as he has said to me before (and Dick Goodwin has said even more often), that one great trouble was that no one would believe it. He said that he could not see how one could write about Johnson the private monster and Johnson the public statesman and construct a credible narrative. ‘He is a sick man,’ Bill said. At one point he and Dick Goodwin became so concerned that they decided to read up on mental illness – Dick read up on paranoia and Bill on the manic-depressive cycle.” [entry of January 14, 1969]
However, it must be pointed out Lyndon Johnson, as a national leader, was by no means unique in his pathologies; in fact, he may not have been particularly extreme in that regard, even in comparison to other American presidents (especially of late) – which is precisely why he serves as a useful case study. A close examination of history will provide many other examples of sociopathic characteristics in those who hold high office, as another entry of Schlesinger’s journal notes in passing:
“Last night I spoke at the annual dinner of the Century. I sat next to Mac Bundy and we discussed, among other things, the Khrushchev memoirs. I remarked on the curious resemblance between Khrushchev's account of the life around Stalin – the domineering and obsessive dictator, the total boredom of the social occasions revolving around him, the horror when invited to attend and the even greater horror when not invited – and Albert Speer’s account of the life around Hitler. Mac said, ‘When I read Khrushchev, I was reminded of something else in addition – my last days in the White House with LBJ.’” [entry of January 15, 1971]
Finally, the last words (a portion of which have already been quoted above, and by others many times) should perhaps belong to John Dalberg-Acton, 1st Baron Acton, who wrote the following in a letter to Mandell Creighton in April 1887 (discussing his opposition, as a Catholic, to the recently instated doctrine of Papal infallibility):
“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority, still more when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of corruption by authority. There is no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder of it.”
VII. Power seeks hegemony. That is, a given power structure has an ever-present objective of eliminating, absorbing, or co-opting any other power that exists, since the latter must always present the possibility of opposing or even defeating the given power. Power cannot willingly tolerate a rival – or, indeed, defiance, as it may suggest the existence of vulnerability.
It is also true that as power grows by assimilating competitors or their resources, it increases its capacity to defeat other rivals and grow further still, so long as it is able to maintain cohesion. Victory favors the big battalions.
The progress toward hegemony can be seen in the discontinuous and uneven, but nevertheless inexorable trend to larger political units, as tribes combine into chiefdoms, chiefdoms into nations, and nations into empires; culminating, in the present day, into the rise of a Western hegemony.
The attainment of hegemonic power need not be the result of a conscious plan, as the formation of the Roman Empire aptly demonstrated. The greater part of its domain was actually acquired under the Republic, before the Empire itself was established – new territory being added gradually, piece by piece, as rivals were encountered and vanquished (e.g. Carthage), intervention in foreign conflicts brought new realms under control (e.g. Greece), and personal ambitions were gratified (e.g. Caesar’s conquest of Gaul). In short, the Empire arose in an unplanned (though not entirely accidental) fashion, each conquest placing Rome in contact with new neighbors, leading to crisis, conflict, and yet further conquests: a cycle perpetuated by a society acclimated to (and eventually organized for) continual warfare and expansion – which in turn destroyed its own republican traditions.
In contrast, Adolf Hitler quite consciously attempted to establish his hegemonic rule over the whole of Europe, and for a time came close to succeeding. Yet his methods were similar to those of Rome, namely direct conquest and occupation; and even his allies were often more in the nature of puppets.
In the aftermath of the war which crushed Hitler, however, something quite different came into being. By virtue of a vast economic base that had been spared the destruction of war, and the capability to exert military force across the globe, the United States emerged as a supreme worldwide power, a situation unprecedented in history. This supremacy was of course challenged by the Soviet Union, but contrary to the fulminations and prognostications of various interests, the latter never equaled the power of its greater rival, save, perhaps, in the sheer destructive potential of atomic weaponry – which, due to the probability of mutual devastation, could not actually be used. Instead, the Soviet empire eventually collapsed as a result of its own internal contradictions, scarcely seven decades after its formation.
The new worldwide power was based not on conquest and occupation, but rather on economic domination and political subordination, carried out in a process of globalization. This commenced immediately with the Bretton Woods agreement (negotiated even before the war ended, in July 1944), which established an international monetary system based on gold and the dollar. However, after 1950 the balance of payments for the United States turned negative, due largely to its maintenance of an immense system of overseas military forces, along with wars in Korea and Vietnam – which eventually resulted in severe bullion outflows, reaching a point where gold redemption was no longer feasible. This crisis was dealt with by the Nixon administration through the simple expedient of unilaterally suspending the convertibility of the dollar into gold – in other words, instead of an international monetary system based on gold and the dollar, it would henceforth be based on the dollar alone. This marked the end of the Bretton Woods system.
That such an act had no severe repercussions – in fact, was even possible – demonstrates, in and of itself, the existence of hegemonic power. To be sure, there were complaints abroad, claiming that the United States could simply issue its own currency to finance its trade deficits, rather than pay with goods; an “exorbitant privilege”, as de Gaulle’s France had already charged in the 1960s. However, such protests did little to alter the situation. In fact, European concerns about the U.S. exporting its inflation were met with the blunt assertion that the dollar was “our currency, but your problem” (as Treasury Secretary John Connally put it). A few years later the dollar was only further entrenched by the institution of the “petrodollar” system, wherein major oil producing nations of the Middle East agreed to denominate their sales in dollars – which were “recycled” through the purchase of U.S. treasury bonds.
A recent book by Adam Tooze, titled Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World, casts further light on these issues. Regarding the financial crisis of 2008, the book makes these observations in its Introduction:
“Hidden below the radar and barely discussed in public, what threatened the stability of the North Atlantic economy in the fall of 2008 was a huge shortfall in dollar funding for Europe’s oversized banks. And a shortfall in their case meant not tens of billions, or even hundreds of billions, but trillions of dollars. It was the opposite of the crisis that had been forecast. Not a dollar glut but an acute dollar-funding shortage. The dollar did not plunge, it rose…
The US Federal Reserve engaged in a truly spectacular innovation. It established itself as liquidity provider of last resort to the global banking system. It provided dollars to all comers in New York, whether banks were American or not. Through so-called liquidity swap lines, the Fed licensed a hand-picked group of core central banks to issue dollar credits on demand. In a huge burst of transatlantic activity, with the European Central Bank (ECB) in the lead, they pumped trillions of dollars into the European banking system.”
In other words, a truly global financial system has been created which, in the end, is dependent on the dollar and its custodian, the Federal Reserve.
As for political subordination under the hegemonic system, its effects had already become clear by 1956, in the event known as the Suez Crisis. In late October of that year the military forces of a trio of nations – Britain, France, and Israel – mounted an operation to seize control of the Suez Canal, which had been nationalized by the Egyptian government in July. This resulted in threats by the Soviet Union to intervene on behalf of Egypt – but more importantly, the threat of serious sanctions against the invading powers by the United States. In consequence, the forces of the trio were forced to summarily withdraw and abandon the operation, while Anthony Eden, the prime minister of Britain, was obliged to resign. Thus were revealed the true positions of the powers involved.
This state of affairs has only become more pronounced with the passage of time. For example, besides being one of the instigators of the Suez Crisis, it has been mentioned that France objected to the “exorbitant privilege” of the dollar in international commerce; words that were backed by deeds, as the de Gaulle regime insisted on converting holdings of dollars into gold, which proved to be a significant source of bullion outflows from the United States. And in an attempt to institute an independent position for his nation, President de Gaulle also withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966, while efforts continued to develop the French nuclear weapons program, part of the so-called “Force de frappe”. But such obstinate independence of action would appear to have become impossible by the present day.
Indeed, in Europe, policies like those of de Gaulle can no longer even be imagined. The dollar has continued to reign supreme in the world at large, without the assistance of bullion, and in spite of the creation of the Euro; while France itself rejoined NATO’s integrated military command in 2009, long after the Soviet threat – supposedly the primary reason for the very existence of NATO – had largely dissipated. The situation was further clarified in 2013, when France, along with Spain and Portugal, conspired to deny the overflight of an airliner carrying the president of Bolivia (which was forced to land in Austria), due to the suspicion that Edward Snowden, discloser of NSA secrets, was also aboard (which proved to be untrue). In other words, all three nations evidently acted in perfect obedience to instructions from abroad – in spite of various formalistic objections to the NSA spying program that had come from Europe. And ironically, regardless of all the attention given to “human rights” by the European project, it seems that some of its nations, among others, had also cooperated in the matter of air transportation for the CIA’s rendition program of extrajudicial prisoner transfers…
As Spengler noted in The Decline of the West (Volume I, Chapter I: Introduction):
“The Imperium Romanum came into existence not as the result of such an extremity of military and financial effort as had characterized the Punic Wars, but because the old East forwent all external self-determinations.”
And so also would Europe seem have foregone most “external self-determinations”, of late. Even the pretense of its independence has largely vanished, as revealed in its futile attempts to establish an independent relationship with Iran, in the face of the Trump administration’s hostility, and its slavish obedience to the dictates of the Biden regime in severing its access to the resources of Russia, after the latter commenced a military operation against the Ukraine.
Nevertheless, just as the Imperium Romanum reached its ultimate limit upon encountering Parthia and the German tribes, it would appear that the modern hegemonic power has also reached its own limit, in the form of opposition by Russia and China. Thus, while the new hegemony can exert power across the world, it does not completely incorporate all of it (which would likely be impossible to achieve, in any case).
It would also be a mistake to regard the hegemonic world order as existing purely for the benefit of the United States. Its effective capital is Washington, but it is truly a global affair, with the leaders of other nations having their places in it, thereby confirming their own positions under its umbrella of authority (and military might). In fact, the very concepts of nations and nationality have come to have steadily less meaning with the passage of time – supplanted by the rise of multinational corporations and international trade organizations, in a relentless process of globalization. The global elite increasingly see themselves as subjects of a world order rather than any particular nation, moving their corporate domiciles, exploiting offshore tax havens, and even exchanging one citizenship for another (often by outright purchase) to gain financial or political advantage. To a certain degree opposition has emerged to such developments, particularly in response to the devastation of industry in the United States, but aside from the imposition of some new tariffs and trade restrictions (of more political than economic effect), a decision by Britain to exit the European Union (in an amazingly self-destructive manner, while remaining tethered to the United States), and a few new industrial initiatives (whose real effect remains to be seen), very little of substance has been done to actually reverse globalization. Such reversal would require fundamental changes to the economic structure of the West, changes that would not benefit those who have profited most from the existing global system.
It might also be said that, in spite of the challenge it constitutes, China’s rising power may have been exaggerated in certain quarters (deliberately so), just as the power of an ascendant Japan was, decades earlier. It is true that China has very successfully industrialized on a trajectory that promises even greater success in the future, with a fundamental resource base much more substantial than that of Japan – yet it remains dependent for its well-being on intimate integration into the world’s economy (as opposed, for example, to the economic autarky sought by the Third Reich). Although China’s domestic consumption has increased, its industry is still heavily geared toward production for export; the West, and particularly the United States, has grown dependent on such exports, but China has too, in the sense that its political stability (and perhaps survival) is dependent on the growth that has come from export production. Then too, China is much more vulnerable to any threat to its food security than the U.S., as it has four times the population, but not much over half the arable land. Meanwhile, the United States has literally ringed the world with military bases, projecting a very basic and commanding form of power into practically every corner of it, while its supposed competitor can only stare forlornly off its own shores at a “renegade” Taiwan. Thus, while China might be a dragon, for the time being (at least) it remains a half-devoured dragon.
And as for Russia, its primary crime seems to be its grim determination to maintain its own security (by military force, if necessary) in the face of the continuous advance of the hegemonic system, which seeks to confront it with a web of nations in the NATO orbit. Thus the Crimea was annexed by Russia in 2014 after a Western supported coup in the Ukraine, since the Russian military base at Sevastopol (the use of which had previously been secured by an agreement) was of vital strategic importance. It should also be noted that historically, the Crimea had never been a part of the Ukraine, until jurisdiction over it was transferred (as a somewhat symbolic gesture) under the Khrushchev regime; and that the Ukraine itself effectively annexed the Crimea in 1995, dissolving its independent administration. Nevertheless, Russia’s actions constituted a defiance of hegemonic power, which hegemony cannot permit, leading to an ever-worsening situation, which finally culminated in a Russian invasion of the Ukraine in 2022.
VIII. Power is relative: it is always measured in relation to other power, for it is this which decides any contest between rivals. Thus power may become greater not only by increasing in magnitude, but also by destroying other power, or by setting potential competitors against one another (“divide and rule”). Though chaos and a general degradation of society may result from such a course, the victorious power will emerge dominant.
Yet again the invasion of Iraq in 2003 provides an instructive example. The destruction of the Iraqi government – and its ability to project power – increased the relative power of the United States in the region; but, ironically, increased the relative power of Iran even more (which may account for the continuing calls, from certain quarters, to attack it). This pattern of destruction has continued with the annihilation of the Libyan government, and the more limited efforts that have taken place in Syria (though Russian intervention considerably altered the situation). In each case the suppression of established governments has been accompanied by a calamitous disintegration of society, rampant violence, and the spread of jihadist organizations.
As for the principle of “divide and rule”, it was, of course, also applied extensively by the colonial powers of Europe in their possessions overseas, setting one tribal group or local potentate against another, thereby weakening them. As the former colonies became independent the resulting enmities often persisted, however, leading to serious internal instabilities, and even civil war.
But the most striking application of divide and rule in the present day might perhaps be seen in the situation that produced the Russian invasion of the Ukraine in 2022. The strategic objective of the West in this instance was to divide Europe from Russia, and its chief tactic may have been an exercise in “kill a chicken to scare a monkey” – the role of the chicken falling to the Ukraine, and the monkey to Europe.
Ultimately, the fate of the Ukraine in the affair was determined by the ethnic divisions within it, coupled with the equally divisive response to them by its government. Russian speakers (as opposed to Ukrainian) comprised a large portion of the population in the eastern and southern regions of the nation (and an absolute majority in the Crimea), but in 2014, after a Western supported coup, Russian was abolished as one of the official languages of the land – evidently as part of an effort of “de-Russianization”. This produced resistance which developed into violence (particularly after a massacre of ethnic Russians in Odessa), and a determined uprising by “separatists” in the Donbass region who demanded greater autonomy. Military action by the Ukrainian government failed to suppress the uprising in the Donbass (which effectively became a civil war), as a result of which the Minsk agreements were reached in 2014 and 2015, which supposedly were intended to resolve the situation, but in fact were never actually implemented – evidently being used by the Ukraine and the West, by their own admission, as a delaying tactic to provide time for a buildup of Ukrainian military forces.
The situation remained unresolved for years, with the Ukrainian government having deployed the bulk of its military forces in the vicinity of the Donbass (not for defense against a general Russian attack). Shelling by Ukrainian artillery in the area increased dramatically in mid-February 2022 (as monitored by the OSCE, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), indicating the possibility of a major offensive. In response, the Russian government granted recognition to two independent republics in the Donbass, and then invaded the Ukraine.
The Russian recognition of republics in the Donbass, accompanied by treaties of defense, would, of course, have largely nullified any prospect of a major effort against them by the Ukraine. That Russia nevertheless mounted a large scale invasion may have been due to the perception that no matter what action it undertook (including the recognition that had just been granted), the reaction by the West would be essentially the same; further, that this might be the last chance for a military intervention, before the Ukraine’s admission to NATO. Thus it might as well commence a maximum effort to neutralize the Ukraine’s military forces, in an attempt to bring a long festering situation to an end.
It is certainly true that the West has continually insisted that membership in NATO must remain a possibility for the Ukraine (without ever actually granting it), in spite of the fact that Russia made plain that such membership was considered to be an unacceptable threat to its security. Indeed, the adamant refusal by the West to negotiate a position of neutrality for the Ukraine might well be contrasted with the agreement that was negotiated to establish the neutrality of Austria in 1955, which caused all occupying forces (including those of Russia) to depart, in the very midst of the Cold War. The ever present possibility of NATO membership thus painted a target on the back of the Ukraine, at which Russia eventually took aim to neutralize its perceived threat, by means of a “special operation”.
Although the commencement of Russia’s “operation” surprised most outside observers, its timing was perhaps not coincidental, as it may have been incited just as operation of the Nordstream 2 pipeline seemed imminent – a pipeline which would have greatly increased Russian natural gas supplies to Europe via direct connection, bypassing the Ukraine. Increased integration of Russia into the economy of Western Europe would, of course, constitute a nightmare for hegemonic power, as it might create a potent rival in the form of a unified pan-Eurasian power, and at the very least would reduce its controlling influence in the region. Indeed, Charles De Gaulle had a vision of such integration in 1959, declaring “Yes, it is Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals; it is Europe, the whole Europe that will decide the fate of the World!”, a phrase that he repeated many times thereafter, describing his idea for a power bloc of Europe that would include Russia, and exclude the United States. But Gaullism (and any notion of a truly sovereign Europe) died years ago, as previously indicated.
Instead, Europe is now to become much more dependent on the United States, as deliveries of liquefied natural gas (LNG), shipped by specialized tankers from the U.S., will supposedly replace the supply lost from Russia. However, the extensive facilities required for such deliveries will require some time to construct, implying shortages in the interim; while the LNG that will eventually be available will come at a drastically higher cost. The result will be extensive damage to the economy of Europe, and thus a decline in its relative power through this cause, as well as its increased dependency.
And so the suppression of Nordstream 2 constitutes a victory for hegemonic power. Significantly, it appeared in July of 2021 that a compromise had been reached to allow operation of the pipeline, after a visit by Chancellor Merkel to the White House (German business interests definitely wanted to have a functioning Nordstream 2, in spite of relentless American opposition); but was this new understanding simply a “head fake”, which concealed a new, clandestine plan by the U.S. to achieve its aims? Indeed, as is well known, President Biden predicted the Russian invasion shortly before it occurred; but was this really a triumph of intelligence collection … or rather a self-fulfilling prophecy? After all, the best way to accurately predict an event is to have caused it in the first place. In the weeks before the invasion the Ukrainian leadership did not seem particularly concerned about its possibility; was there misdirection by an outside agency, which also encouraged an offensive (or at least the appearance of one) in the Donbass, for the purpose of provoking a Russian response? Of course, the scale of the Russian response, and its effectiveness, may not have been foreseen, but such errors are common enough in history.
Further evidence of a clandestine plan has been provided by explosions which seriously damaged both Nordstream pipelines – the perpetrator of which supposedly remains a “mystery”, in spite of the fact that the Baltic Sea is practically a NATO lake, that President Biden declared “there will be no longer be a Nord Stream 2”, that his Secretary of State described the damage as a “tremendous opportunity”, that Polish politician Radek Sikorski publicly thanked the U.S.A. for the damage, that by sheer coincidence a pipeline from Norway to Poland commenced operation on the very day that the damage took place … not to mention reportage by veteran journalist Seymour Hersh, which described, in some detail, the sabotage operation undertaken by the United States, with the assistance of Norway.
In any case, it certainly appears that the Ukrainian chicken is being dismembered, and the European monkey is very scared, as witnessed by the decisions of the Finnish and Swedish governments to seek membership in NATO. Even the fate of the chicken itself may not be final, as a rump state of what remains of the Ukraine may yet serve as a platform for the continuing power-struggle with Russia – raised from the dead as a zombie chicken. Thus use of the older term “the Ukraine” instead of simply “Ukraine” seems most appropriate, as the name means “borderland”, a condition to which the region is rapidly declining – no longer a functioning nation, but rather a devastated and depopulated borderland between Russia and the West.
IX. Power often operates most economically through an intermediary. In this manner resources of the intermediary may be expended or casualties taken by it, instead of the directing power; in case of failure or an embarrassing result, the intermediary may be blamed or disposed of; and it may be possible for the directing power to deny involvement in whatever transpires, good or ill, concealing its true purpose. Of course, intermediaries may not prove to be completely reliable, but this drawback must be weighed against the possible advantages of their employment.
A classic case involving the employment of an intermediary may be seen in the support given by the United States to the “contra” rebels in their assault on the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, during the period from 1979 to 1990. Without this support no significant military effort would have been possible by the contras; and even with it, they failed to achieve a military victory. However, as a result of the costs of a long and devastating war (in which atrocities committed by the contras greatly outweighed those of the government), the Sandinistas were voted out of office in February 1990. The fact that they abided by the result of the election (and, in fact, had earlier been confirmed in power by an election in 1984 that was judged by international observers to have been quite fair), suggests the possibility that they may not have constituted the totalitarian menace that the Reagan administration had incessantly claimed them to be…
Machiavelli’s Prince provides another example regarding an intermediary, and a particularly cynical one (even for that work); the “duke” referred to in the excerpt below (from Chapter VII) is none other than Cesare Borgia (the Duke of Valentinois):
“When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer Ramiro d'Orco, a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied and dismayed.”
Evidently Ramiro d’Orco had employed harsh measures to restore order, and his sudden demise at the hands at the hands of his master not only removed an overpowerful servant, but inspired a useful combination of fear and gratitude among the populace.
X. It is in a situation of countervailing power that the lesser may thrive in the face of the greater. Where great powers are in opposition, but too well matched for one to emerge as the unchallenged victor, lesser powers may be permitted to go their way as neutrals, or perhaps be sought as allies. Even individual persons may profit in such a situation. Of course, it is possible to end as a mere pawn in a struggle between great powers; but it is by the perspicacity of the lesser (and the chances of fortune) that such might be avoided.
In the aftermath of the war which defeated the Axis powers two great powers emerged, as previously noted: the United States, and its lesser rival, the Soviet Union. Each had its bloc of allies and puppets, which relied on the dominant partner for protection and support; for example, it would seem that Russian backing was the only reason Cuba was not invaded by the U.S. in the aftermath of Castro’s revolution, which nevertheless resulted in a confrontation that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war in October 1962. Other nations in the spheres of the great powers, such as France and Yugoslavia, managed to carve out certain areas of independence for themselves by exploiting the tensions between their dominant partners. A different strategy was to seek advantage in neutrality; Nasser’s Egypt, for instance, was initially courted by both of the leading powers, and even defended by them in the Suez Crisis. However, Nasser was eventually judged to be unreliable by the U.S., and its support was thereafter thrown overwhelmingly to Israel, as well as Saudi Arabia. More recently the Ukraine has simply been ground to pieces between Russia and the West, but this was likely the result of the incompetence of its leadership: for what else could one expect of a dysfunctional government of kleptocrats and fascists, presided over by a television clown?
The interesting case of Edward Snowden, previously mentioned in passing, is also illuminating. He was able to obtain refuge in Russia, reduced in influence since its Soviet days, but still possessing formidable atomic weaponry (and a great degree of policy independence) – perhaps the only place in the world where he could have obtained a truly secure haven. That Russia is not generally regarded as a beacon of “freedom” only makes the situation more humiliating for the United States, and is perhaps one of the reasons for its hostility toward Putin’s regime. (In contrast, the position of Julian Assange (of Wikileaks fame) in the Ecuadorian embassy in Britain proved to be treacherous indeed, finally ending in his betrayal to the British authorities.) Edward Snowden may be confined to Russia, but it also happens to be the largest nation on earth…
XI. Power has no friends. Certainly it may make alliances or enter into coalitions, but these are always contingent upon perception of benefit. That benefit must be of overarching importance to all the various factions in a coalition, who may well have serious differences, but will nevertheless unite to pursue a common goal. Further, the relative position of each faction and the degree of its influence will be determined by its importance to the group. Sentiment may be employed to depict an alliance in favorable light, but will never serve as the basis for one.
Power may also have opponents, but again these are contingent – it has no inherent enemies, just as it has no friends. The opponent of today may be the ally of tomorrow (and vice-versa). As Lord Palmerston put it in his remarks in the House of Commons in 1848: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” (Though of course the question arises of exactly what those interests are – how they are arrived at – and for whom.)
Hitler’s regime was finally defeated by an alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union – a somewhat uneasy coalition, but effective in its military purpose. With the demise of the common enemy, however, the hostility which had previously existed between the Western powers and Russia not only returned, but was resumed with greater force. In fact, even before the end of the war the Truman administration may have attempted to confront Soviet power through the atomic bombings of Japan – intended as a stark demonstration of a new and overwhelming form of military might. In the end, however, this exhibition merely induced the Soviets to develop their own advanced weaponry, in a program which detonated an atomic bomb by 1949. The rivalry between the powers thus became intensified still further, resulting in the confrontation known as the Cold War.
And as for the alliance between the United States and Britain, it has already been described how, in the Suez Crisis, it became necessary for the former to demonstrate its superior position to the latter.
XII. Power is often sought most effectively through misdirection. In other words, to create the impression that certain goals, often of an idealistic character, are of paramount importance – but in actuality are superseded by objectives that are of a different nature altogether. Thus political factions may oppose one another over social issues which are portrayed (to their supporters) as being of utmost significance, yet are not nearly so important (in and of themselves) to the leadership of the factions, so long as they involve no great questions of money or power. In fact, the opposing leaders may be in tacit agreement regarding issues where money and power are of primary importance. The social issues in question thereby serve to generate support for the factions, while at the same time distracting the public’s gaze from the true objectives of the powerful.
A pertinent example of misdirection in recent times may be seen in the opposing factions of the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States. Social issues such as abortion, gay marriage, gun control, religious expression, and racism serve to excite opposition between these factions in a new version of Kulturkampf, and thus ostensibly defines them through their differences. Yet it might be noted that none of these issues directly involve really large sums of money, at least on a national scale. On the other hand, there has been a great deal of agreement between the parties concerning their policies, as actually implemented, on the globalization of trade, privatization of the government, and the financialization of the economy, all of which deal with truly colossal flows of money.
Thus the presidential candidates of both major parties supported the North American Free Trade Agreement during the election of 1992 (opposed only by the insurgent Ross Perot, whose campaign eventually met with mysterious difficulties); the “normalization” of trade with China was supported by both the Clinton administration and presumptive presidential nominee Bush (junior), after which it was approved by Congress in 2000; the Glass-Steagall Act, an important part of a system of regulations that had impeded endemic financialization (though steadily eroded over the years), was repealed with bipartisan support; a “grand bargain” to privatize Social Security, arrived at between President Clinton and Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, was derailed only by the political turmoil of the Lewinsky affair; the policy of bailing out the financial industry after the crash of 2008, which commenced at the end of the term of Bush (junior), continued with little change during the Obama administration; while Obama also made every effort to push forward the Trans-Pacific Partnership, with considerable bipartisan support, in spite of the embarrassment this caused presidential candidate Hillary Clinton in 2016, who claimed to have reversed her position regarding the measure. Only recently has opposition to certain aspects of such “big money” policies arisen – interestingly, in both major parties, and as insurrections against the established leadership (though with limited success).
It might also be observed that the major parties have been in even closer agreement in the sphere of foreign policy. Trenchant opposition to Russia has been a principal (if not overriding) theme ever since the end of World War II, except for a period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, when it was thought that a “shock therapy” program of economic liberalization might fully subordinate the crippled nation to the hegemonic world order (which did not prove to be the case). In fact, claims that Russian interference in the election of 2016 somehow brought about the defeat of Hillary Clinton, and opposition to Russia's more recent invasion of the Ukraine, have only caused “liberals” to mirror the traditional anti-Russian attitudes of “conservatives”. Fundamental to such policies, of course, has been bipartisan backing for the NATO alliance and its continuous expansion. Interventions in the Middle East have also enjoyed broad bipartisan support, and advocacy for Israel is effectively unlimited in both major parties. So far as China is concerned, attitudes held in common toward it have followed a similar pattern to those regarding Russia – first, confrontation during the Cold War, then a warming when economic liberalization took hold, and finally renewed opposition as the Asian nation waxed in power.
There have, of course, been differences between the official positions of the parties over certain details of foreign policy, chiefly concerning the degree of danger posed by one foreign competitor or another (though not regarding the overall danger itself, or related military budgets), and the wisdom of particular military interventions has occasionally been called into question (most often after they have gone awry, as in Vietnam and Iraq, but not before). Yet agreement over major issues has greatly exceeded any differences, for once again, as Spengler put it: “the State is the internal order of a people for its external purpose.”
Of course, in spite of its utility, misdirection may sometimes fail or become irrelevant, particularly when dissension arises over an issue that has both social aspects and substantial implications for money and power. Such an issue was the conflict over the peculiar institution of slavery in the United States, which involved not only questions of civil rights, but enormous economic consequences, the scale of which have often not been fully appreciated. In a letter of 1859, Abraham Lincoln wryly noted that the two major political parties seemed to have switched their historical positions on this matter – the Democrat-Republicans (later simply Democrats) of Jefferson, who had originally held personal rights to be preeminent, now supported property rights, in the form of slave-holding, above all; while the anti-Jefferson party (in the beginning the Federalists, supplanted first by the Whigs, and then the Republicans), which had originally favored property rights, now opposed slavery:
“Remembering too, that the Jefferson party were formed upon its supposed superior devotion to the personal rights of men, holding the rights of property to be secondary only, and greatly inferior, and then assuming that the so-called democracy of to-day, are the Jefferson, and their opponents, the anti-Jefferson parties, it will be equally interesting to note how completely the two have changed hands as to the principle upon which they were originally supposed to be divided.
“The democracy of to-day hold the liberty of one man to be absolutely nothing, when in conflict with another man's right of property. Republicans, on the contrary, are for both the man and the dollar; but in cases of conflict, the man before the dollar.
“I remember once being much amused at seeing two partially intoxicated men engage in a fight with their great-coats on, which fight, after a long, and rather harmless contest, ended in each having fought himself out of his own coat, and into that of the other. If the two leading parties of this day are really identical with the two in the days of Jefferson and Adams, they have performed the same feat as the two drunken men.”
Slavery was quite unusual in being an issue on which violent disagreement arose within the established order on both its social and big-money aspects. The result was the most devastating conflict the United States has ever endured, in the form of the Civil War, which perhaps illustrates the danger of such fundamental disputes.
It is also interesting to observe that the positions of the two major parties switched yet again over the years, the Republicans now holding property to be preeminent, with the Democrats supposedly championing personal rights. And lately, in what may be an even more tectonic shift, the GOP appears to be striving to become the party of the working class, while the former party of the New Deal seeks to cater to the sensibilities of the university educated. A dreadful cynic might even entertain the possibility that the parties actually have no genuine principles at all – save a devotion to money … and hegemonic power. As Gore Vidal observed in his article “State of the Union” for Esquire magazine in May 1975 (which described his experiences on the lecture circuit):
“Sometimes, if I’m not careful, I drift prematurely into my analysis of the American political system: there is only one party in the United States, the Property party (thank you, Dr. Lundberg, for the phrase) and it has two wings: Republican and Democrat. Republicans are a bit stupider, more rigid, more doctrinaire in their laissez-faire capitalism than the Democrats, who are cuter, prettier, a bit more corrupt—until recently (nervous laugh on that)—and more willing than the Republicans to make small adjustments when the poor, the black, the anti-imperialists get out of hand. But, essentially, there is no difference between the parties.”
The term “Property party” is not a bad one. But an even better title for the functional over-party of the United States (and many another nation) might be Elite Party – for that would more completely describe its overriding goal, quite apart from any misdirection provided by subsidiary issues: to preserve and promote elite interests, above all else.
XIII. The attainment of power may finally be decided by a power-struggle, or direct confrontation between contenders, the ultimate expression of which is war. A variety of rationales may be offered to justify such a conflict, and some may even contain a certain amount of truth. However, whatever the veracity of such claims, the primary goal of a power-struggle is power itself, over and above all other considerations.
The Second World War is often portrayed as a modern crusade, directed against the horrific evil of the Hitler regime. In a sense this is true; the Nazi government was indeed fantastically malevolent, and brought to an end by that conflict. And of course many of those involved in the war saw themselves as fighting for a just cause.
However, it would appear that the leadership of the Allies, as a whole, perceived the situation rather differently – that is, for them, the war was primarily a struggle for power, rather than an idealistic battle against evil. This might be seen in the attitude of the established order in United States prior to the fall of France in May 1940, when it was generally felt that it would be best to stay out of the war, as it was a primarily European affair that might drag on for years. However, the sudden defeat of France (and a British expeditionary army) after a campaign of only five weeks produced a tremendous shock, raising the possibility of German domination of all of Europe – and perhaps much else besides. Thus, by the fall of 1940 official opinion in America had completely reversed, advocating greatly expanded involvement in the conflict, which produced the Lend-Lease program and a sizable military buildup. However, perception of the malevolence of the Third Reich, and its treatment of those under its control, scarcely altered during the intervening months, which was not much discussed in any case. What had altered was the balance of power – with the very real possibility of the rise of a competing Eurasian hegemony.
And regarding the malevolence of the Hitler regime, much could indeed be known. Information about the program to exterminate the Jews of Europe, along with various other ethnic groups, certainly existed at the highest levels early in the war – for example, by February 1940, British intelligence was able to monitor the radio transmissions of German police battalions in occupied Poland, and obtained detailed information on the first mass executions there. It might also be noted that the following official statement was issued on December 17, 1942 by the American and British governments on behalf of the Allied Powers:
“The attention of the Belgian, Czechoslovak, Greek, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Soviet, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslav Governments and also of the French National Committee has been drawn to numerous reports from Europe that the German authorities, not content with denying to persons of Jewish race in all the territories over which their barbarous rule has been extended the most elementary human rights, are now carrying into effect Hitler's oft-repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe. From all the occupied countries Jews are being transported in conditions of appalling horror and brutality to eastern Europe. In Poland, which has been made the principal Nazi slaughterhouse, the ghettos established by the German invader are being systematically emptied of all Jews except a few highly skilled workers required for war industries. None of those taken away are ever heard of again. The able-bodied are slowly worked to death in labor camps. The infirm are left to die of exposure and starvation or are deliberately massacred in mass executions. The number of victims of these bloody cruelties is reckoned in many hundreds of thousands of entirely innocent men, women, and children.”
This was actually a fairly accurate description of the true situation. However, no immediate efforts were made to directly assist those in peril. The United States had very tight limits on immigration, both before and after the war commenced in September 1939, and even after its own entry into the conflict in December 1941, with the result that large numbers of refugees were prevented from reaching safety. It was not until January 1944 that the War Refugee Board was finally established, which, even though not well supported by the U.S. government (contributions from Jewish organizations covered most of its costs), nevertheless proved instrumental in saving the lives of up to 200,000 Jews – and of course a great deal more could have been achieved if such an effort had been made earlier. Proposals were also made to bomb the Auschwitz concentration camp or the rail lines leading to it; whether desirable results would have been obtained is debateable, but those in command do not seem to have regarded the possibility very seriously. In short, the plight of those targeted for extermination was, for the most part, a matter of low priority.
Even after the war ended – and the horrific crimes of the death camps became widely known – the attitude against admission of refugees persisted for some time. The door of entry to the U.S. largely remained closed. The home countries of many of the Jewish survivors did not want them back, and in numerous cases non-Jews had taken their property, raising a variety of awkward issues. Thus the majority of Jewish refugees initially ended up back in camps – displaced person camps, of course, rather than death camps – but camps nonetheless. It might be mentioned, however, that there was one category of refugees who proved to be welcome: a number of technical specialists of the Third Reich and various collaborators with its regime, who were recruited to assist the West during the Cold War. For yet another great power-struggle had already commenced…
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And so we have arrived at the power of states, in a world entirely organized into states: power exerted within the states themselves, and power exerted between them. Given the very nature of power – its necessity, its tendency to corrupt, its ultimate imperative for hegemony – a picture begins to emerge of the nature of human society itself.
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Sources:
The story of Adolf Hitler’s rise to power has of course been extensively documented. The Third Reich Trilogy of Richard J. Evans is generally regarded as the definitive history of the Nazi regime, and it is indeed impressive in its analysis. Another account of the period may be found in Tragedy and Hope, a History of the World in Our Time, by Carroll Quigley – a version that is particularly interesting in its examination of the policies of the Western powers toward a re-ascendant Germany. Supplementing both of these works is The Wages of Destruction, The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy by Adam Tooze, which describes the economic realities of the Third Reich, and the part they played in influencing its policies.
A detailed treatment of the development of American foreign policy after the fall of France in 1940 is provided in the book Tomorrow, the World, by Stephen Wertheim.
Further reading on the attitude of the leadership of the Allies toward the victims of the Hitler’s extermination program may be found in The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust 1941–1945, by David S. Wyman; and Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938-1941, by the same author.
George Reedy’s Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir was quoted above in view of the author’s lengthy personal association with his subject, and thus the psychological insights he was able to provide. However, it should also be mentioned that Robert Caro has written several impressive volumes on the life of Johnson, which reveal certain aspects of that individual’s history of which Mr. Reedy was evidently not aware.
The quotations made from The Prince were taken from the translation by W.K. Marriott.
The quotations from Spengler’s The Decline of the West and Man and Technics were taken from the translations by Charles Francis Atkinson.
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A Personal Afterword
The principles of power, as outlined above, will probably be unsettling to many readers, especially those unacquainted with the darker aspects of history. Stories of power typically have no heroes, but many villains. Yet it must not be assumed that a statement of the principles of power in any way constitutes an endorsement of them – certainly not an endorsement as a desirable standard of behavior.
In other words, what has been presented is an effort of observation, rather than prescription. If a man falls from the top of a hundred story building, and happening to witness this, a passerby comments that he is likely to die, this statement is, of course, simply an observation – the witness did not cause the man to fall, nor, in all likelihood, did he even wish him to fall. (In fact, it is probable that the witness would rather not have seen the event at all.) If the witness has spoken in error, it is an error of perception, rather than one of desire. What is seen is all that the witness can know; and what is known leads to the assumption that the falling man is likely to come to a sudden end.
What Niccolo Machiavelli presented in his best-known work, The Prince, was also unsettling, to the extent that its author became quite notorious. In fact, it has sometimes even been suggested that Machiavelli’s treatise was actually a work of satire. Yet the work itself argues against this, for again and again the principles it enunciates are supported by extraordinarily cogent examples, both ancient and (for Machiavelli) contemporary. Thus it is, in its very essence, a pragmatic work, portraying the art of politics as actually practiced in the world known by its author – rather than a work of theory, or a hopeful picture of how things ought to be, or a denunciation through irony; though, given the nature of the subject, it is possible that the author’s commentary was, from time to time, of an ironical nature.
In any case, an understanding of the reality of power (rather than an idealistic conception of it) is absolutely essential for any understanding of human affairs, as they actually play out in the world. It may even be essential for the perception of one’s own place in that world; to alter somewhat a quote attributed to Leon Trotsky, “you may not be interested in power, but power may be interested in you” – as countless individuals have discovered, when swept up in the sometimes violent turmoil of historical events.
And finally, in a last word regarding the realities of power, it might be appropriate to offer another observation by Spengler, from The Decline of the West (Volume 2, Chapter XI: The State and History):
“In the historical world there are no ideals, but only facts – no truths, but only facts. There is no reason, no honesty, no equity, no final aim, but only facts, and anyone who does not realize this should write books on politics – let him not try to make politics. In the real world there are no states built according to ideals, but only states that have grown, and these are nothing but living peoples ‘in form’.”